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ESSAYS ON FARMER WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN BEST 




This dissertation explores the adoption of Best Management Practices (BMPs) in the 
Kentucky River watershed. Through a survey of farmers in the Kentucky River 
watershed, chapter two investigates farmers’ current BMP adoption and their willingness 
to engage in additional adoption incentivized through a proposed Water Quality Trading 
(WQT) program. This chapter includes two parts: the first part is to investigate the factors 
influencing farmers’ current usage of BMPs; the second part is to estimate farmers’ 
willingness to implement BMPs given different levels of compensation specified in the 
survey. Farmers’ experiences about BMPs are more likely to persuade them to adopt 
additional BMPs. The activities of using riparian buffers, fencing off animals and 
building up waste storage facilities are found to be responsive to the levels of 
compensation offered.  
 
The third chapter discusses farmers’ expected economic benefits from BMP adoption, 
and addresses the missing data issue. In the survey, of those respondents who indicated 
that they accept the offered level of compensation, about 20% of them did not answer the 
follow-up question of how much they would adopt the practice, creating missing data. 
We compare three methods to handle the issue of missing data: deletion method, mean 
imputation, and multiple imputation method. Following these methods, we estimate 
factors affecting how much farmers may engage in BMPs using a Tobit or Poisson model. 
The results show that increasing the compensation for using BMPs is more likely to 
encourage farmers to adopt riparian buffers. Results obtained using the method of 
multivariate imputation by chained equation are more promising than using the deletion 
or mean imputation method.  
 
The fourth chapter examines whether wealth change and local community interaction 
may affect BMP adoption. Survey data on BMP adoption are combined with the local 
community data from publically available sources. Results show that the decrease in land 
values between 2007 and 2012 discouraged the adoption of riparian buffers; the equine 
inventory in local communities has positive impact on the adoption of animal fences and 
 
nutrient management; the more rural the local communities are, the less likely farmers 
would fence off livestock from water resources. 
 
KEYWORDS: Best Management Practice, Water Quality Trading,  
 Multivariate Imputation by Chained Equation, Local Community  
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
1.1 Background  
 
Water quality trading (WQT) programs are market-based programs that establish a 
mechanism allowing the party with higher abatement costs to purchase emission permits 
directly or indirectly from the party with lower abatement costs (EPA 2004). As a result, 
those with higher abatement costs will abate less while those with lower costs will abate 
more but be compensated by the permit buyers. The overall goal is to maintain or 
improve the water quality in a watershed where the buyers and sellers of permits coexist 
(EPA 2004). 
The WQT programs are initiated to assist dischargers in a watershed to meet the Total 
Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) provisions of the Clean Water Act of 1972 (CWA) 
(Wainger and Shortle 2013). The provisions authorize the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) to establish a cap on pollution discharges in a watershed to achieve CWA 
goals, and TMDLs are designed as a cap on point and nonpoint sources (PSs and NPSs) 
to limit pollutant loadings. Under TMDLs in an impaired watershed, dischargers are 
encouraged to trade emission permits, thus water quality standards are achieved at a 
lower cost than traditional regulations.  WQT experiments began in the US in the early 
1980s, mostly in the form of pilot or demonstration projects (OECD 2012). United States 
EPA officially introduced the WQT program in 2003, which led to at least 22 activated 
trading programs across 14 states (Selman et al. 2009).  
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Traditionally, the primary U.S. water quality law, the CWA, regulates point sources 
pollution from factories, plants, or pipes. In contrast to pollution from point sources, 
emissions from agricultural NPSs are mostly exempt from federal and state regulation 
directly (Braden and Boyle 2013; Fowler, Royer and Colburn 2013). However, 
agriculture run-off is a main source of pollution for water resources, and agricultural 
NPSs contribute a relatively large share of the pollutant load in some impaired 
watersheds. The WQT is a promising mechanism to provide an opportunity for farms to 
abate agricultural run-off while farmers also can obtain a new source of income. In WQT 
programs, agricultural NPSs are considered as the suppliers of emission credits to create 
offsets for the trading market by implementing Best Management Practices (BMPs). As a 
supplier in trading market, one of the advantages of agricultural NPSs is a lower 
abatement cost than PSs. In addition, the traditional solutions to control PSs discharges 
are not available for agricultural NPSs (Segerson 1988). As an alternative, pollution from 
agriculture is always regulated by voluntary approaches, thus agricultural NPSs are 
encouraged to engage in BMPs to abate. These advantages allow agricultural NPSs to 
supply water quality credits and abate farm run-off loading in a WQT program.  
However, point-nonpoint WQT programs have not been developed successfully. To 
date, only 4 programs have had trading occur in 15 established point-nonpoint trading 
programs, especially in trading markets related to agricultural NPSs. Ribaudo and 
Gottlieb (2011) summarize several issues which may limit trading, such as stringency of 
the cap, practice uncertainty, cost of finding trading partners, fear of regulation, limit of 
flexibility, baseline requirements, and interactions with conservation programs. The 
problem of stringency of the cap is that the discharge cap, TMDLs, are not developed 
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well so there is no demand for nonpoint source credits. The practice uncertainty is that 
the performance of implementing BMPs is hard to be measured and monitored, so credits 
generated by NPSs are not reliable. One of the important reasons for practice uncertainty 
is the compensation from PSs cannot meet farmers expected economic benefits from 
implementing BMPs. The cost of finding trading partners is the transaction costs to 
identify farmers’ willingness to participate in BMPs through WQT programs. Fear of 
regulation is due to the fact that agricultural NPSs are exempted from regulation. Farmers 
may not be used to inspection on their lands. The limiting flexibility means that the 
practices for generating WQT credits are limited, and farmers may not be able to use their 
private practice to produce trading credits. The baseline requirements indicate that 
farmers are required to adopt a set of conservation practices prior to trading programs to 
make themselves eligible to generate credits from additional run-off abatement. The 
interactions with conservation programs describe the situation that if farmers in a 
watershed have already adopted large percent of BMPs on their land, the farm’s capacity 
to use additional BMPs may limit the amount of trading. Shortle (2013) states that most 
of the economic studies on WQT have focused on market design instead of market 
prediction and uncertainty. Market prediction and uncertainty includes understanding the 
factors influencing farmers’ engagement in BMPs and participation in WQT programs, 
how much participants will trade, and what factors are likely to hinder trading. All in all, 
this study is motivated by the above challenges.  
  
1.2 Objective and Structure 
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The purpose of this thesis is three-fold. The first is to investigate farmers’ current 
usage of BMPs in Kentucky, and the factors affecting farmers’ choices of BMPs through 
WQT programs. These steps will improve the market prediction, and help local agency 
identify farmers’ willingness to participate in WQT programs. Second, this study 
examines how much farmers may engage their lands in BMPs if they decide to 
implement BMPs, thus to discuss farmers’ limited ability to produce trading credits. In 
addition to economic and demographic characteristics, the third is to explore how wealth 
changes and local community interactions influence farmers’ BMP adoption.    
Chapter two is intended to investigate farmers’ willingness to participate in BMPs 
through a proposed WQT program in Kentucky. A contingent valuation method (CVM) 
is used in this section through a survey of farmers in the Kentucky River watershed. The 
survey data were collected from 2011 to 2012. The WQT program did not exist in 
Kentucky when the data were collected, and still does not exist to date. Since the WQT 
program is designed to offer farmers compensation for implementing BMPs, the CVM 
question is whether the respondent will accept the offer of some compensation for using 
the BMPs specified by the WQT program. Five BMPs are featured: riparian buffers, 
animal fences, no till, waste storage facilities, and nutrient management. The analysis in 
this section includes two parts: the first part is to investigate the factors influencing 
farmers’ current usage of BMPs; the second part is to estimate farmers’ willingness to 
implement BMPs given different levels of compensation given in a survey.  
Chapter three is motivated to explore how much farmers may engage their lands in 
BMPs through a WQT program in Kentucky. This section is conducted using a survey of 
farmers in the Kentucky River watershed introduced in Chapter two. Besides asking the 
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question of farmers’ willingness to implement BMPs, the survey also asked a follow-up 
question that how much farmers may adopt the BMPs (in addition to what they have 
already used) if they are offered compensation through WQT. With respect to five 
different types of BMPs, about 21.5%, 26.9%, 24.2%, 23.2%, and 18.2% of respondents 
did not indicate how much they would adopt BMPs. Before data can be analyzed, missing 
responses in our survey need to be addressed since the percentage of missing data is more 
than 5% (Schafer, 1999). We compare three methods to handle the issue of missing data: 
deleting the observations with missing values, mean imputation, and Multivariate 
Imputation by Chained Equation (MICE). Following these missing data treatments, we 
estimate factors affecting how much farmers may engage in BMPs using a Tobit or 
Poisson model.  
Chapter four is to investigate effects of wealth changes and interactions with local 
communities on BMP adoption in addition to farmers’ demographic and socioeconomic 
variables. The farm investment as BMP adoption is subject to farm financial condition. 
The urban housing market bust during 2007-2008 significantly decreases farmland values 
(Zhang and Nickerson 2015).The decrease of farm wealth therefore discourages 
environmental investments such as BMP adoption on farmlands in the future. In addition 
to economic factors, previous studies also show that social interactions could motivate 
farmers to commit to environmental services (Michel-Guillou and Moser 2006). However, 
most studies use self-rated variables to capture effects of social interactions on BMP 
adoption which may overestimates adoption. To our knowledge, few studies have 
explicitly examined the effect of wealth changes on BMP adoption, and no study to date 
has examined the social interaction effects using local community characteristics data. To 
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proceed, we develop a conceptual framework to model decisions of BMP adoption, and 
the decisions are subject to farm’s wealth condition. Then, we specify the linkage 
between BMP decisions and social interactions with local communities. In the empirical 
analysis, we combine survey data on BMP adoption conducted between 2011 and 2012 in 
Kentucky with publicly available data. The wealth change is approximated by percentage 
differences of land value between 2007 and 2012; the social interaction effects of local 
community include urban and rural effect, residential effect, and local agricultural 
recreation business effect.  
 
 





    The purpose of this paper is to explore farmers’ willingness to implement BMPs in 
order to prepare them to participate in a proposed WQT program. A contingent valuation 
method (CVM) is used through a survey to farmers in the Kentucky River watershed. The 
Kentucky River watershed, also known as the Kentucky River basin, contains 7,000 
square miles across 42 counties with 16,000 miles of streams. The 700,000 residents in 
this area use about 100 million gallons of water per day from streams and reservoirs in 
the watershed. More than 2,075 square miles of the watershed have been designated as 
priority watersheds (sub-watershed), impacted by pathogens, nutrients, habitat, alterations, 
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siltation, low dissolved oxygen, and metals (Carey 2009). The Kentucky River basin 
discharges into the Ohio River, which together with the Upper and Lower Mississippi 
River sub-basins discharges significant quantities of nutrients to the Gulf of Mexico. The 
excess of nutrients directly causes the hypoxic zone, an oxygen-depleted area that cannot 
support aquatic life. The survey data were collected from 2011 to 2012. The WQT 
program did not exist in Kentucky when the data were collected, and still does not exist. 
Since the WQT program is designed to offer farmers compensation for implementing 
BMPs, the CVM question is whether the respondent will accept the offer of some 
compensation for using the BMPs specified by the WQT program. After searching for 
historical agricultural BMP information and consulting with experts in agronomy and 
relevant government agencies, we have chosen five BMPs that are feasible and realistic 
in our study area. The five BMPs are: riparian buffers, animal fences, no till, waste 
storage facilities, and nutrient management
1
.   
The empirical study includes two parts. The first part is to discuss who is participating 
in BMPs in Kentucky, so the empirical model investigates the factors influencing farmer 
current usage of BMPs. The second part is to investigate who may participate in 
additional BMPs propagate by WQT programs. The empirical model estimates farmer 
willingness to implement BMPs given different levels of compensation that could be 
offered by WQT programs. Explanatory factors considered in this analysis are farm 
characteristics, farmer demographic characteristics, environmental characteristics, and 
targeted farmers. Finally, the results present the probabilities of farmers implementing 
BMPs at the different levels of compensation. 
                                                            
1 The BMPs are also called conservation practices in USDA. The name of each practice may 
change. The definition of each practice are described in following link:  
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detailfull/national/technical/?cid=nrcs143_026849   
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2.2 Literature Review 
 
    The actual design of the trading market is one of the most frequently discussed topics 
in WQT programs. The research on the design of trading markets includes determining 
the participants, calibrating the trading ratio, evaluating the efficiency of institutions in 
the market, examining market barriers, and comparing different trading systems (Horan, 
Shortle and Abler 2002; Horan and Shortle 2005; Breetz et al. 2005; Ghosh, Ribaudo and 
Shortle 2011; Horan and Shortle 2011). However, few studies focus on understanding the 
choices farmers make given the context of WQT programs (Shortle 2013). One of the 
reasons is that most researchers are interested in market mechanism issues. Another 
reason is that the qualitative data that are typically collected are insufficient to support 
any substantive statistical analysis (Windle et al. 2005; Peterson et al. 2007). 
In order to investigate farmers’ choices of BMPs through WQT programs, it is 
necessary to review the research on farmers’ choices of conservation programs and BMPs. 
This is because both WQT programs and conservation programs aim to encourage 
farmers to implement BMPs to abate pollution discharge. The conservation program 
sponsored by the USDA is a voluntary incentive program to address natural resource 
issues, to avoid the difficulties of regulation, and to reduce economic hardship to farmers 
through payment and assistance. It includes land retirement programs, working-land 
programs, agricultural land preservation programs, and conservation technical assistance 
(USDA 2014). Past research on farmers’ choices in conservation programs is to 
investigate the determinants of farmers’ participation in the programs. In addition to 
demographic characteristics, some other characteristics are considered as explanatory 
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factors, such as farms’ geographic characteristics and the targeted farm group (Lynch and 
Lovell 2003; McCann and Núñez 2005; Lambert, Sullivan, et al. 2006; Nickerson and 
Hand 2009). Targeted farmers are defined as beginning (farming less than 10 years), 
limited-resource (farm gross sales less than $105,000), and socially disadvantaged 
(nonwhite) farmers. Nickerson and Hand (2009) find that targeted farms, accounting for 
40% of all US farms, have different conservation priorities and receive different levels of 
payments from the government. In our study, we also include targeted farms to examine 
whether disadvantaged groups have different preferences and willingness to use BMPs.  
In the earlier literature, a large number of studies have been published investigating 
adoption choices for conservation practices. Most these studies research the factors 
influencing farmers’ choices of BMPs using a revealed preference method. These 
analyses consider the observed variables, such as farmer household characteristics and 
farm characteristics, as the independent variables to explain BMP adoption using 
ordinary least squares or binary choice models. In the early stage, Ervin and Ervin (1982) 
develop a two-stage decision-making framework to explain farmer adoption of BMPs. 
The two stages are recognition and adoption. Besides the two-stage model, several 
studies discuss the effect of investment decisions, monetary compensations, types of 
BMPs, land tenure, and conservation programs on the adoption of BMPs (Featherstone 
and Goodwin 1993; Cooper and Keim 1996; Wu and Babcock 1998; Soule, Tegene and 
Wiebe 2000; Núñez and McCann 2004; Claassen and Duquette 2012). 
    Knowler and Bradshaw (2007) synthesize 31 analyses of factors affecting the adoption 
of conservation agriculture from a total of 23 published papers in order to identify 
explanatory variables consistently influencing adoption. Their synthesis groups the 
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factors into four categories including farmer and farm household characteristics, farm 
biophysical characteristics, farm financial/management characteristics, and exogenous 
factors. In their aggregated analysis, no evidence points to a set of universal or consistent 
factors that can explain adoption choices. They conclude that the choices of the analytical 
methods, the influence of region and the conservation agriculture practices considered by 
researchers may lead to the divergence of the significance and signs of the factors across 
31 distinct analyses. 
    Prokopy et al. (2008) conduct an analysis to review 55 studies about the determinants 
of farmer adoption of BMPs in the USA using a vote count methodology. They 
categorize the determinants as four groups−capacity, attitudes, awareness and farm 
characteristics. Their results also cannot conclude the factors consistently influencing 
BMP adoption. However, they find that education levels, income, farm sizes, capital, 
farm operation diversification, labor, information, land tenure, landscape and land quality 
have significant relationships with BMP adoption. Other factors show mixed results of 
significance and signs across the investigated studies. In addition, factors influencing 
BMP adoption have different impacts on the adoption of different types of BMPs.    
We include several plausible factors chosen from the previous literature to explain 
farmers’ choices of BMPs in our empirical analysis. The choices of relevant variables in 
this study and how we estimated these variables have also been described in the empirical 
model section. 
As such, our intention in this paper is not to offer a definitive answer to the question on 
why farmers adopt conservation practices −there is unlikely to be such an answer. Our 
main contribution is to add to the discussion and enrich the evidence supporting these 
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different factors, including the economic incentives farmers may receive from adopting 
conservation practices. 
    This study conducts a survey using a CVM to investigate the factors influencing 
farmers’ willingness to participate in BMPs under the context of WQT programs. 
Although some researchers criticize the bias results of CVM in some cases (Arrow et 
al.1993; Diamond and Hausman 1994; Hausman 2012), this method is still employed for 
two reasons. First, the CVM is suited to estimate health choices, transportation choices, 
and farmers’ operation choices, and the CVM estimates are useful as baselines for 
valuation (Haab et al. 2013), even if the CVM may not perform well in all circumstances 
(Hanemann 1994). Second, the CVM is a simple and flexible method for investigating 
goods or services not on the market yet, and create different what-if conditions under 
which the goods and services can be evaluated. Third, previous studies show that choice 
experiment methods may be too complicated for farmers to comprehend, thus may not 
collect sufficiently high quality data to support substantive statistical analysis (Windle et 
al. 2005; Peterson et al. 2007).  
This study follows Cooper and Keim’s (1996) work. They estimate the factors 
encouraging farmers’ adoption of BMPs, and predict the probability of farmers adopting 
practices as a function of the compensation. They use a sample selection model and the 
double hurdle model in their econometric estimation because the CVM question in their 
survey is conducted only if a farm is not currently using water quality practices. In our 
survey, the CVM question is conducted regardless of whether a farm is currently using 
BMPs, in order to avoid sample selection issues.  
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2.3 Data  
 
The survey data were collected from randomly chosen farmers across 35 counties in the 
Kentucky River watershed from October 2011 to March 2012. The response rate is 23%
2
, 
and there are 357 valid observations out of 459 responses. Table 2.1 displays the 
demographic summary of the Kentucky farmers included in this study and the state 
average from the US agricultural census data in 2012. As can be seen in this table, except 
higher than average farm size, our sample does not appear to be drastically different to 
the state average. The survey questions include current usage of BMPs, willingness to 
participate in BMPs, participation in environmental programs, farm’s characteristics, and 
respondents’ demographic characteristics.  
In the survey, the key questions involve two parts. The first question is phrased “are 
you currently using any of the following water quality management practices on the farm 
you are operating?” These practices include riparian buffers, animal fences, no till, waste 
storage facilities and nutrient management. The respondent could answer yes/no with 
respect to each practice. 
    The second key question follows the first one and is phrased “Regardless of whether 
you are currently participating in any government cost share programs, if you knew that 
by using water quality management practices on your land, a nearby waste/sewage water 
treatment plant or factory will cover X% of your cost of implementing these practices, 
would you be interested in using additional water quality management practices (BMPs) 
                                                            
2
 Our study has a comparable response rate to the existing literature on farmers’ choices 
of BMPs. From the synthesis of Knowler and Bradshaw (2007) and Prokopy et al. (2008), 
very high response rates are often observed in studies with very small sample sizes (often 
in two digits or in low hundreds). 
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in the form of the following activities: riparian buffers, animal fences, no till, waste 
storage facilities and nutrient management?” The respondents are asked to specify their 
answer for each of the BMPs separately given the level of compensation. In the survey, X% 
is replaced with one of the following levels with equal probability: 75%, 80%, 85%, 90%, 
95%, 100%, 105%, 110%, 115% and 120%. When answering the survey, each 
respondent will see only one questionnaire with one of these levels. In other words, 
respondents are randomly assigned to a questionnaire with different levels of 
compensation. In order to avoid the sample selection problem, CVM questions are asked 
regardless of whether a respondent is currently using the BMPs. 
In the second key question, a respondent could answer “yes”, “no”, or “not possible for 
me” with respect to each practice
3
. The “not possible for me” option captures the 
possibility that farmers have already maximized their potential to adopt BMPs. Table 2.2 
presents the frequency of responses who were willing to adopt additional BMPs, the 
frequency of respondents assigned to each level of compensation, and the percentage of 
yeses to the question when respondents faced each level of compensation. 
   Furthermore, the survey is designed with four types of information explaining the 
meaning of WQT programs. One of the four levels of the information is randomly 
                                                            
3
  The “not possible for me” category is an agrarian or geographic issue but not a decision 
issue. During focus group discussions and pretests before the survey, the “not possible for 
me” category was repeatedly confirmed by respondents that it was clear in the survey that 
these practices were physically not feasible or applicable on their land. The numbers of 
farmers not possible to adopt riparian buffers, animal fences, no till, waste storage 
facilities, and nutrient management are 208, 175, 179, 206 and 181 respectively. In 
addition, we have conducted a robustness test for “not possible for me” responses. 
Following Adamowicz et al. (1998), we have run a multinomial logit analysis of “yes”, 
“no” and “not possible for me” responses to test whether “not possible for me” responses 
were consistent with either the “yes” or “no” response. These results show that there are 
no systematic factors determining the “not possible” group and the other two groups. 
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assigned with equal probability to the survey. This design is to examine whether the 
different levels of information will influence an individual’s response. The first type of 
information is the baseline with basic explanation of WQT programs. The information 
does not contain any further description or interpretation of WQT programs. The second 
type of information includes the information in the first type but also includes an 
additional message on WQT programs, focusing on their cost saving implications. The 
third type contains the baseline information and also information emphasizing the 
environmental benefit from WQT programs. The fourth type provides the baseline as 
well as an explanation of WQT programs, focusing on both cost saving and 
environmental benefit information. Appendix 2.1 displays the four types of information. 
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 present all variables and summary statistics for the entire sample. Fig 
2.1 shows the spatial distribution of respondents in our survey at the zip code level. The 
size of blue circles represents number of observations coming from a particular zip code 
in our survey. The map base is the population density at zip code levels obtained from the 
U.S. census 2010. Generally, our sample covers most of the Kentucky River watershed, 
and the spatial distribution of our survey is consistent with the population density.  
 
2.4 Theoretical Model 
 
A farmer’s choice is understood through random utility theory (McFadden 1974). 𝑈𝑎 and 
𝑈𝑏 denote the individual utility from two choices, “yes” or “no”. In this article, for the 
first key question, “yes” means the respondent is currently using BMPs; “no” means 
otherwise. For the second key question, “yes” indicates the respondent accepts the offer 
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to implement additional BMPs through WQT programs; “no” indicates otherwise. The 
following equation is the utility functions of 𝑈𝑎 and 𝑈𝑏.   
           𝑈𝑎 = 𝑥
′𝛽𝑎 + 𝑎   𝑎𝑛𝑑     𝑈𝑏 = 𝑥′𝛽𝑏 + 𝑏                                          (2.1)    
where 𝑥  is a vector of observed variables in individual utility function, including 
compensation (C) offered from the survey (for the second key question); 𝛽 is a vector of 
coefficients;  is the  𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. random variable with zero mean. If 𝑈𝑎 > 𝑈𝑏, an individual 
will choose “yes”, then the observed indicator y equals 1. If 𝑈𝑎 ≤ 𝑈𝑏, an individual will 
choose “no”, then the observed indicator y equals 0. Therefore, the probability that an 
individual will choose “yes” could be written as equation 2.2 (Greene 2007). 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑦 = 1|𝑥] = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑈𝑎 > 𝑈𝑏|𝑥]                                                                         
= 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑥′𝛽𝑎 + 𝑎 > 𝑥
′𝛽𝑏 + 𝑏 |𝑥]                                                                                 
= 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑥′(𝛽𝑎 − 𝛽𝑏) + ( 𝑎 − 𝑏) > 0 |𝑥]                                                            
= 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑥′𝛽 + > 0 |𝑥]                                                                             (2.2) 
In this paper, the binary choice is estimated using a logit model. Thus, the probability 
function, equation 2.2, is rewritten as logistic cumulative distribution function, equation 
2.3. Equation 2.4 is derived from equation 2.3 to represent the commonly known odds 
ratio (in log form): 





                                                                           (2.3) 
log [
𝑃(𝑦 = 1)
1 −  𝑃(𝑦 = 1)




2.5 Empirical Model  
 
2.5.1 First Part: Current Usage of BMPs Models 
 
    The first part of the empirical model estimates farmers’ actual usage of BMPs. The 
survey question used in this part is “are you currently using any of the following water 
quality management practices on the farm you are operating? Those practices are riparian 
buffers, animal fences, no till, waste storage facilities and nutrient management.” The 
answer for each BMP is a binary choice, yes/no, and is estimated using logit models.  
    There are six regressions in the current usage of BMP models
4
. One regression is to 
analyze all BMPs included. If a farmer uses any of the five practices, the decision is a 
“yes”, otherwise “no.” The other five regressions are separate for the five different types 
of BMPs. Regardless, the dependent variables are the yes/no answers. Equations 2.5 and 
2.6, derived from equation 2.4, are mathematical representations of logit regression, 
estimating all of the current usage of BMP models: 
log [
𝑃(𝑦1 = 1)
1 −  𝑃(𝑦1 = 1)
] = 𝛼10 + (∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑛𝑥𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1
)                                             (2.5) 
log [
𝑃(𝑦𝑖 = 1)
1 −  𝑃(𝑦𝑖 = 1)
] = 𝛼𝑖0 + (∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑛𝑥𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1
) + (∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑗
6
𝑛=2
 )  ( 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗)   (2.6) 
                                                            
4
 Our preliminary work considered the multivariate probit model to reflect joint adoption 
of several BMPs by each respondent, but the model could not be implemented in our case 
for two reasons. First, since farm biophysical characteristics are different across farms, 
BMPs that are possible to be adopted for each respondent are different across our sample. 
None of the farms could implement all types of BMPs, and the multivariate probit model 
cannot be applied. Second, even if we treat “not possible” as “no”, the multivariate probit 
model could not converge. As a result, we use five separate probit models but in each 
model the decision of whether to adopt the other BMPs are included to control for the 
correlation between different BMPs.  
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where,   𝑖 =  2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ; each 𝑖 also identifies a model, and there are six regressions in 
total.  
j  = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6; each j denotes a BMP such as riparian buffers, animal fences, no till 
waste storage facilities and nutrient management respectively. N is the number of 
variables. Other notations are explained below:   
𝛼10 𝛼𝑖0, 𝛼𝑖𝑛 ,and  𝛾𝑖𝑗 are coefficients   
Dependent variable:  𝑦1, 𝑦2, 𝑦3, 𝑦4, 𝑦5 ,𝑦6 
𝑃(𝑦1 = 1)= probability of currently using any BMPs among riparian buffers, 
animal fences, no till, waste storage facilities or nutrient management 
𝑃(𝑦2 = 1)= probability of currently using riparian buffers 
𝑃(𝑦3 = 1)= probability of currently using animal fences 
𝑃(𝑦4 = 1)= probability of currently using no till 
𝑃(𝑦5 = 1)= probability of currently using waste storage facilities 
𝑃(𝑦6 = 1)= probability of currently using nutrient management 
Independent variable:  𝑥𝑛 
𝑥𝑛 = farm’s characteristics, farmer’s characteristics, environmental aspects and 
variables indicating whether a farm is a targeted farm. 
    Most of those variables are considered from previous research (Ervin and Ervin 1982; 
Featherstone and Goodwin 1993; Cooper and Keim 1996; Traore, Landry and Amara 
1998; Wu and Babcock 1998; Soule, Tegene and Wiebe 2000; Lynch and Lovell 2003; 
Núñez and McCann 2004; McCann and Núñez 2005; Lambert, Schaible, et al. 2006; 
Hand and Nickerson 2009; Claassen and Duquette 2012).  
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    Farm characteristics capture the effects of farm’s biophysical characteristics and farm 
management characteristics on BMP adoption, and these variables include land size, rent 
percent, surface water, percentage of household income from farming, total household 
income reinvested back to farm, farms with crop, and farms with livestock. Farmer 
characteristics examine the impact of farmer’s demographic characteristics on BMP 
adoption, and the variables include age, gender, education, income level, farming 
experience, and water recreation activities (Knowler and Bradshaw 2007; Prokopy et al. 
2008).    
    The environmental aspects include farmers’ participation in the Conservation Reserve 
Programs, participation in Working-Land Programs, farms’ water quality, and farmers’ 
concern of environmental issues. The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) is the land 
retirement program from conservation programs sponsored by the USDA. Participants in 
the CRP are compensated annually to retire environmentally sensitive land from 
agricultural production for 10 to 15 years. The Working-Land Program (WLP) is one of 
the conservation programs that encourage farmers to adopt BMPs on working land to 
achieve environmental benefits (USDA 2014). In our survey, the WLP includes the 
Conservation Stewardship Program, Environmental Quality Incentives Program, and 
Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program. Participations in CRP and WLP are introduced as 
binary variables. Farm’s water quality is a discrete variable rated by farmers themselves. 
The variables of farmers’ awareness are obtained from a survey question that asks 
farmers to rate their concern for environmental issues. 
Targeted farmers are represented in the models by two dummy variables: socially 
disadvantaged and beginning farmers. The variable income level is a proxy for the 
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targeted farmers with limited resources. In addition, we also include dummy variables 
showing the current BMP usages. These dummy variables are added to examine whether 
there is any synergy to using BMPs. 
 
2.5.2 Second Part: Willingness to Implement Additional BMPs Models 
 
    The second part of the empirical model estimates farmers’ willingness to implement 
additional BMPs given different levels of compensation. Farmers who responded “not 
possible for me” are not included in the logit analysis of farmers’ willingness to 
participate in additional BMPs. The binary outcome is whether farmers will implement 
additional BMPs (1 if yes, 0 if no) following the compensation offered through WQT 
programs, and is estimated using logit regressions. 
In equation 2.7, the binary dependent variable (𝑦′1) indicates whether farmers would 
accept the offer to adopt additional BMPs for any of the five different types (1 if yes, 0 if 
no). Equation 2.8 shows whether farmers may say yes to one of the five BMPs 
respectively (𝑦′2, 𝑦′3, 𝑦′4 ,𝑦′5, 𝑦′6), 
log [
𝑃(𝑦′1 = 1)
1 −  𝑃(𝑦′1 = 1)
] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶 + (∑ 𝛽1𝑛𝑥𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1
) + 𝜃11𝑦1                   (2.7) 
log [
𝑃(𝑦′𝑖 = 1)
1 −  𝑃(𝑦′𝑖 = 1)
] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑖𝐶 + (∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑛𝑥𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1
) + (∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑛𝑦𝑛
6
𝑛=2
 )         (2.8) 
where,  𝑖 = 2,3,4,5,6; each 𝑖 also identifies a model, and there are five regressions in total. 
𝛽0 , 𝛽1, , 𝛽1𝑛,  𝜃11, 𝛽𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖𝑛 , 𝜇𝑖𝑗 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜃𝑖𝑖 are coefficients.  
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j  = 2,3,4,5,6; each j denotes a BMP such as riparian buffers, animal fences, no till, waste 
storage facilities and nutrient management respectively.  
N is the number of variables.  
𝐶, 𝑥𝑛, 𝑦1, 𝑦𝑛 are independent variables 
𝑥𝑛= farm’s characteristics, farmer’s characteristics, environmental aspects, targeted farm 
status and the type of WQT program information farmers received 
𝐶 = the compensation offered, which will cover a certain percentage of the cost of 
implementing the BMPs.  
The current usage of BMPs (𝑦1 , 𝑦𝑛) is the proxy to measure the unobserved variable: 
previous experience with BMPs. Cameron and Englin (1997) find that respondent’s 
experiences, defined as numbers of years in which individual has been a user of 
environmental goods, could influence the contingent valuation of those resources. In our 
research, we consider the current usage of BMPs to capture the effect of experiences with 
environmental practices on the willingness to adopt additional BMPs.  
 In this analysis, we examine the cross-effect of adopting BMPs through including the 
current usage of the five types of BMPs. Finally, for the action to adopt additional BMPs, 
we also allow the decision to adopt one practice to explain the adoption of the others, to 






2.6 Results  
 
2.6.1 First Part: Current Usage of BMPs  
 
    Table 2.5 reports the results of logit regressions for farmers’ current usage of BMPs. 
Model 1 is the current usage of any BMP model; models 2-6 are the current usage of the 
five different types of BMP models.  
    For farms’ characteristics, types of farm production are highly significant factors 
explaining the current usage of BMP. Holding other factors constant, farms having crop 
production are more likely to use riparian buffers and no till; farms having livestock 
production are more likely to use animal fences, since this practice is designed for farms 
with livestock. 
    In addition, the results in farms’ characteristics tell that the current usage of BMPs is 
also determined by the percentage of household income from farming, rent area, and 
surface water on farmland. Holding other factors constant, farms with surface water 
resources tend to build up riparian buffers along the surface water, but are less likely to 
use nutrient management. Farmers earning mainly from farming prefer to adopt no till. If 
farmers rent more acres for operating, they would like to adopt no till on their land. 
Movafaghi, Stephenson and Taylor (2013) state that no till is a production improvement 
practice, which has more than environmental benefits. Based on their findings, if farmers 
rent a large area or have a higher percentage of household income from farming, they are 
more likely to adopt no till for higher productivity. 
    For famers’ characteristics, farmer’s education and water recreation activities would 
affect the current usage of BMPs. Holding other factors constant, farmers with higher 
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education prefer to adopt BMPs, especially adopting riparian buffers and nutrient 
management. Farmers participating in water related recreation activities at least once a 
year would like to use BMPs, especially using riparian buffers. In addition, older farmers 
are more likely to build up waste storage facilities. However, no evidence is found that 
farmers’ gender and farming experience are related to the current usage of BMPs. 
    An interesting result in farmers’ characteristics is that income level does not affect the 
current usage of BMPs. This finding is consistent with Featherstone and Goodwin’s 
(1993) result that the income level is not a determinant factor for conservation investment 
decisions. Instead, the source of income influences the current usage of BMPs. Table 2.5 
shows that the more farmers earn from farms, the more likely they would use BMPs. 
Lynch and Lovell (2003) and Núñez and McCann (2004) also conclude a similar result 
that a lower percentage of off-farm income will encourage farmers to participate in BMPs 
or environmental programs. 
   For environmental aspects, participation in the CRP and the WLP are important 
contributors to the current usage of BMPs. Concerns for the environment is another factor 
affecting farmers’ current usage of BMPs, but poor water quality near farms may not 
stimulate farmers to implement BMPs. The results show that farms participating in the 
WLP prefer to adopt animal fences; farms participating in CRP tend to use no till and 
animal fences. Claassen and Duquette (2012) have a similar result that farms’ payment 
programs have high levels of additionality. Additionality refers to farms that would not 
achieve environmental gains without payment incentives. The finding in this paper 
confirms the additionality of farmers’ payment programs that the government payment is 
a significant incentive mechanism affecting the current use of BMPs. Furthermore, if 
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farmers are concerned about environmental issues near their farms, they are more likely 
to use riparian buffers and nutrient management. 
    In addition, we observe a synergy effect that farmers tend to implement some BMPs as 
a bundle. Our result shows that no till, waste storage facilities, and nutrient management 
are more likely to be practiced together.  
No statistical evidence suggests that targeted farms have any special preference for 
BMPs. Also, ten years of farming experience is not a threshold period for farming 
decisions on BMPs. Socially disadvantaged farmers do not have any different preference 
for BMPs compared to other farmers. 
 
2.6.2 Second Part: Farmers’ Willingness to Participate in Additional BMPs through 
WQT Programs 
 
Table 2.6 presents the results of logit regressions for the willingness to participate in 
additional BMPs. Model 7 describes the willingness to participate in any additional 
BMPs; models 8-12 are for the willingness to participate in a specific type of BMP. 
    In expectation, compensations could influence farmers’ participation in BMPs, so the 
offer (C) would be statistically significant with a positive sign. However, the regression 
results show that the compensations do not change the probability of participation in 
practices of no till and nutrient management, and only positively affect the probability of 
participating in riparian buffers, animal fences and waste storage facilities. 
    For farms’ characteristics, farm size, rent area, surface water on farmland, percentage 
of household income from farming, total household income reinvested back to farm and 
types of farm production all play a role in participation in additional BMPs. Large-size 
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farms are less likely to use animal fences. Farmers who rent more farmland are less likely 
to implement no till, but this result is opposite to that in the model describing current 
usage of the BMP. Farms with surface water resources prefer to build up waste storage 
facilities, because this practice is designed to prevent a farm from contaminating water 
flows. However, these farms are less likely to fence off animals from water resources and 
adopt nutrient management on their land. Previous studies show that off-farm work (and 
thus income) may limit the time that farmers can invest in labor-intensive practices (e.g., 
building fences), but others find off-farm work/income increases the resources that can be 
used for capital intensive practices (e.g., precision agriculture) (Knowler and Bradshaw 
2007; Prokopy et al. 2008). Our result shows that the percentage of income coming from 
the farm (which is opposite to income from off-farm) only has significant impact on the 
adoption of animal fences. Animal fences can be both labor and capital intensive. Famers 
investing large shares of their income in their farms prefer to implement additional 
riparian buffers and build up more waste storage facilities. Farms with livestock 
production have no interest in putting in additional effort to fence off animals, but 
farmers having crop production prefer to implement additional no till and nutrient 
management. 
    For farmers’ characteristics, the factors affecting farmers’ willingness to implement 
additional BMPs are age, gender, farming experiences, education, income levels and 
water recreation activities. Specifically, older farmers may refuse to spend more effort in 
fencing off animals and no till. Male farmers prefer to build up additional animal fences, 
but are less likely to use waste storage facilities. Farmers with more farming experience 
tend to adopt additional no till, but may refuse to use more riparian buffers on their farms. 
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Farmers with higher education are in favor of having additional no till and nutrient 
management. This implies that if education raises willingness to adopt BMPs, it is more 
likely to encourage farmers to adopt BMPs by providing more information through 
agricultural extension services. Farmers with water related recreation activities at least 
once a year prefer to adopt more nutrient management. The results also show that income 
level only influences farmers’ decisions to implement additional waste storage facilities. 
    For environmental aspects, our results show that although conservation programs are 
important contributors to the current usage of BMPs in Kentucky, there is no statistical 
evidence that these programs would encourage farmers to implement additional BMPs in 
the future. However, perceiving worse water quality near the farm could encourage 
farmers to adopt BMPs. Poor water quality near farms would lead farmers to use more 
riparian buffers, animal fences, and no till in the future, but could not influence the 
current usage of BMPs. 
    One interesting finding in environmental aspects shows that the coefficient of the CRP 
is significant with negative sign in the willingness to implement an additional no till 
model but is significant with positive sign in the current usage of the no till model. In 
other words, it implies that if farmers currently participate in the CRPs, they are more 
likely to use no till currently, but are less likely to use no till generated through WQT 
programs in the future. One possible explanation is that farmers with the CRP have 
already adopted no till as much as they could, so there is no eligible land for them to 
expand the scope of this practice. 
Table 2.6 shows that previous experiences of BMPs have significant effects on 
encouraging farmers to expand the scope of the BMPs through WQT programs. If 
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farmers are currently using a BMP on their farm, they are more likely to use more of the 
same BMP in the future, except for waste storage facilities. Table 2.7 summarizes the 
result from Table 2.6 that explains the effect of farmers’ current experience of BMPs on 
their adoption of additional BMPs. The results show that if farmers are currently using 
riparian buffers, they are more likely to build up waste storage facilities, and less likely to 
use no till. If farmers are currently using waste storage facilities on the farm, they may 
not adopt additional riparian buffers and use nutrient management in the future. If 
farmers are currently using nutrient management, they will not consider animal fences 
and waste storage facilities through WQT programs. 
In addition, we observe the synergy of using BMPs in that there are certain sets of 
BMPs often/almost always chosen together in the survey. Table 2.8 summarizes the 
results from Table 2.6 displaying the synergy of future BMP adoption. If farmers would 
like to use riparian buffers, they are more likely to adopt animal fences and nutrient 
management together. If farmers would like to build up animal fences on their land, they 
tend to implement riparian buffers, build up waste storage facilities, and adopt no till on 
their farms. If farmers would adopt more no till on their land, they are more likely to use 
riparian buffers, waste storage facilities and nutrient management at the same time. If 
farmers would like to build up waste storage facilities, they are more likely to build up 
animal fences, and use nutrient management through the WQT program as well. If 
farmers tend to use nutrient management in the future, they are more likely to implement 
no till, and build up animal fences and waste storage facilities at the same time. 
For targeted farms, most results are similar to the ones in the current usage of the BMP 
model. There is no statistical evidence that targeted farms have systematically different 
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preferences to the implementation of additional BMPs currently, and in the future, except 
that socially disadvantaged farmers prefer to build up waste storage facilities. 
Results also show that the information about cost savings from the WQT programs is 
an effective form to introduce the WQT programs. In model (7), the result implies that 
the cost saving information positively motivates choices of using a BMP. To be specific, 
the results from models (9) and (12) show that the cost saving information about WQT 
programs is more likely to encourage famers to consider adopting animal fences and 
nutrient management on their land. Furthermore, combined information about cost 
savings and environmental benefits from WQT programs is more likely to encourage 
farmers to consider adopting nutrient management. There is no evidence to show that the 
information about environmental benefits from WQT programs alone has any effect on 
motivating farmers to consider BMPs. All of these results indirectly imply that cost 
savings or economic benefits are more likely to trigger the adoption of BMPs instead of 
environmental awareness. This finding, in turn, suggests that different types of 
information may generate different rationales and differing responses by farmers. 
Although it is not the intention in this paper to investigate what specific decision 
heuristics farmers use under these circumstances, it remains an interesting future research 
venue. The fact that WQT programs may bring additional financial benefits to farmers 
raises the issue of whether WTP questions may only tap into a particular set of cognitive 
processes and farmers’ decision-making. 
Finally, Figures 2.2 and 2.3 present graphs of the relationship between the percentage 
of cost compensation and the probability of implementing BMPs. Holding other 
explanatory variables at sample median,4 the probabilities that farmers implement 
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additional BMPs at different levels of compensation are calculated from Equation 2.3 
using the estimated coefficients. Since offer (C) variables are only significant in the 
willingness to build up riparian buffers, animal fences and waste storage facilities models, 
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show the probabilities of implementing these three BMPs as a 
function of the percentage of the compensations. Our results also show that cost saving 
information about WQT programs is effective in triggering farmers to use additional 
animal fences. Figure 2.2 shows that the predicted probabilities of using animal fences 
when cost saving information is presented are significantly higher than the ones without 
the information. At 75%, 100% and 120% of cost compensation, predicted probabilities 
of using animal fences with cost saving information are 98.9%, 99.6%, and 99.8% 
respectively. The predicted probabilities of using animal fences without the information 
treatment are 94.5%, 98.1% and 99.2%, respectively. In Figure 2.3, the trend shows that 
if the compensation rises, the probabilities that a farmer adopts riparian buffers and builds 
waste storage facilities through WQT programs increase. At 75%, 100% and 120% of 
cost compensation, the probabilities of using riparian buffers are 0.8%, 2.6% and 5.3% 
respectively, and the probabilities of building waste storage facilities are 1.1%, 2.6% and 
5.3%, respectively. Finally, our prediction shows that the probabilities of adopting animal 
fences are much greater than adopting riparian buffers and waste storage facilities.  One 
possible explanation is that in addition to economic factors, biophysical characteristics 
may also determine the adoption of riparian buffers and waste storage facilities. 
Generally, farms with livestock only need one or two waste storage facilities; and areas 
of water resources on farms limit the adoption of riparian buffers. Oppositely, animal 
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fencing is a more flexible practice than any other practices investigated in our study. 
Thus, it may be adopted by more farms.  
 
2.7 Conclusion and Implications 
 
    This paper explores farmers’ willingness to participate in BMPs through WQT 
programs in Kentucky. The study includes two parts. The first part is to investigate the 
factors influencing farmers’ current usage of BMPs. The second part is to estimate 
farmers’ willingness to participate in additional BMPs given different levels of 
compensation that may be offered through the WQT programs. 
    In the first part, the most significant result is that farmers who are already participating 
in conservation programs are more likely to use BMPs. Farms with different types of 
production, as well as the source of income, affect farmers’ current usage of BMPs, but 
the actual level of income does not. Furthermore, targeted farmers who are limited in 
their production and social reach do not have any different preference to adopt BMPs 
compared to other farms, and 10 years of farming experience does not appear to be a 
threshold for the decisions on using BMPs. 
    In the second part, the most important finding is that higher compensations from WQT 
programs only encourage farmers to further implement three of the five BMPs considered: 
building up riparian buffers, fencing off animals and building up waste storage facilities. 
Another interesting finding is that the experience on BMPs is more effective in 
influencing farmers to implement additional BMPs than the compensation they may 
receive. In contrast to the result in the first part, farmers participating in the CRP or WLP 
have no apparent interest in implementing additional BMPs. The results show the 
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probabilities of farmers adopting additional BMPs based on the different levels of 
compensation. This will help policy makers facilitate the WQT market by encouraging 
the trading partners to properly set up the price of the tradable permits. 
    There are two implications from the results. First, farmers in Kentucky are likely to be 
encouraged to build up riparian buffers, animal fences and waste storage facilities 
through the compensation potentially provided by buyers in the WQT market. It implies 
that the water quality trades related to, or targeted at, the three types of BMPs are 
possible through a proposed WQT program in Kentucky. In contrast, there is no 
statistical evidence supporting that farmers could be encouraged to implement no till or 
nutrient management through the compensation from these programs. It indicates that 
tradable permits related to these two practices may not be available in the WQT market. 
This implication will provide the buyers with the information about potential permits in 
the market, and assist policy makers to design the trading ratios and allocate budgets with 
respect to specific practice. 
    The second implication from the results is that farmers who are currently using riparian 
buffers, animal fences, no till, and nutrient management are more likely to expand the 
scope of these practices to generate additional credits for WQT. It implies that when 
buyers in the WQT market intend to purchase the emission permits generated from the 
above four practices, it is efficient for buyers to trade with farmers who are currently 
using these practices. This implication could also help policy makers target who may 
participate in WQT programs to supply the trading permits. 
    The goal of WQT programs is not only to fulfill the mission of conservation in 
agriculture, but also to promote PS and NPS trading as a way of reducing the cost of 
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meeting water quality goals in a watershed. If the market mechanism is likely to motivate 
those who are already using some BMPs to adopt more, or utilize additional effort, the 
market mechanism can facilitate the mission of WQT programs. Our study shows this. 
For non-adopters, and except for those where adoption is physically impossible or 
irrelevant, the compensation generated through the market mechanism may incentivize 
them to become an adopter. As our results show, once they become an adopter, they will 
be more likely to adopt more in the future. Finally, since we show that the market 
mechanism is likely to have a stronger impact toward those who are already using some 
BMPs, if WQT programs or other conservation programs can provide nonusers with 
more education, training, and other assistance to help them become an adopter of BMPs, 




2.8 Tables in Chapter 2 
Table 2.1 Demographic Summary of Kentucky Farmers from the U.S. Agricultural 
Census Data in 2012 and Our Sample 
Variable  U.S. agricultural census 2012 (Kentucky) Our sample 
Age  57.6 60.15 
Male percentage 89.36% 85.7% 
Farming experience 25.1 32.2 
Race (Percentage of white) 98% 95.5% 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.3 Variable Summary Statistics 
Variable N=357 Definition of Variables Mean Std. Dev. 
Current BMPs adoption:  
𝑦1 Currently using  any BMPs (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.74 0.44 
𝑦2 Currently using  riparian buffers (=1); otherwise 
(=0) 
0.37 0.48 
𝑦3 Currently using  animal fences (=1); otherwise 
(=0) 
0.47 0.50 
𝑦4 Currently using  no-till (=1) ; otherwise (=0) 0.31 0.46 
𝑦5 Currently using  waste storage facilities (=1) ; 
otherwise (=0) 
0.07 0.25 
𝑦6 Currently using  nutrient management (=1) ; 
otherwise (=0) 
0.24 0.43 
Cost coverage compensation: 
Offer The percentage that treatment plant or factory will 
cover the cost of implementing the BMPs if the 
farmer uses the additional BMPs, there are ten 
different levels of compensation. Those levels are 
75%, 80%, 85%, 90%, 95%, 100%, 105%, 110%, 
115% and 120%.  
0.97 0.15 
Explanatory variables:  
Land size Land size includes rented and owned land for 
operating. (unit: 1000 acre) 
0.28 0.54 
Rent percent Rented land for operating / Total land for 
operating   
0.14 0.28 





Share of pre-tax household income from farming 






Share of pre-tax household income back to 
farming (see table 2.4) 
2.53 1.54 
Farms with crop Farms earning revenue from crop or farmers 




Farms earning revenue from livestock or raising 
livestock (=1) ; otherwise (=0) 
0.80 0.40 
Age Farmer’s age 60.15 11.91 
Male Male =1; otherwise (=0) 0.86 0.35 
Education Farmer’s education level (see table 4) 4.08 1.92 
Income level Household annual pre-tax income level (table 2.4) 4.36 1.50 
Farming 
experience 





Table 2.3 Continued 
Variable  Definition of Variables Mean Std. Dev. 
Water 
recreation 
Participating in water related recreation at least once 
a year (=1) ; otherwise (=0) 
0.66 0.47 
CRP Currently participating in Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP) (=1) ; otherwise (=0) 
0.12 0.32 
WLP Currently participating in Working-Land Program 
(WLP) (=1); otherwise (=0). WLP includes 
Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP), 
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), 
Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program (WHIP)  
0.20 0.40 
Water quality Discrete levels from 1 to 7 indicating the poorest to 





Respondents’ awareness of issues concerning the 
environment Self-rated with seven levels. Level 
seven is very aware, and level one is unaware.  
4.95 1.56 
Target farmers:  
Beginning 
farmers 




Operator’s race is not white (=1) ; otherwise (=0) 0.05 0.21 
Infeasible to implement BMPs 
𝑧1 Answer “not possible for me” to all BMPs (=1) ; 
otherwise (=0) 
0.35 0.48 
𝑧2 Answer “not possible for me” to riparian buffers 
(=1) ; otherwise (=0) 
0.58 0.49 
𝑧3 Answer “not possible for me” to animal fences 
(=1) ; otherwise (=0) 
0.49 0.50 
𝑧4 Answer “not possible for me” to no-till (=1) ; 
otherwise (=0) 
0.50 0.50 
𝑧5 Answer “not possible for me” to waste storage 
facilities  (=1) ; otherwise (=0) 
0.58 0.50 
𝑧6 Answer “not possible for me” to nutrient 
management  (=1) ; otherwise (=0) 
0.51 0.50 
Information: The survey was designed with 4 levels of information explaining the 
meaning of WQT programs 
Level 1 The least detailed information level (=1); 
otherwise (=0) 
0.24 0.43 
Level 2 The less detailed information level(=1); otherwise 
(=0) 
0.26 0.44 
Level 3 The more detailed information level(=1); 
otherwise (=0) 
0.21 0.41 
Level 4 The least detailed information level(=1); otherwise 
(=0) 
0.29 0.46 




Table 2.4 Frequency Distribution of Discrete Variables 
Level Percentage of household income from 
farming 
Frequency Percent 
1 0-15% 162 45.38% 
2 16-30% 77 21.57% 
3 31-45% 36 10.08% 
4 46-60% 28 7.84% 
5 61-75% 17 4.76% 
6 75-90% 17 4.76% 
7 above 90% 20 5.6% 
Level 
Total household income reinvested 
back to farm 
Frequency Percent 
1 0-15% 106 29.69% 
2 16-30% 116 32.49% 
3 31-45% 48 13.45% 
4 46-60% 45 12.61% 
5 61-75% 20 5.6% 
6 75-90% 13 3.64% 
7 above 90% 9 2.52% 
Level Income ($) Frequency Percent 
1 0 to 14999 14 3.92% 
2 15000 to 24999 21 5.88% 
3 25000 to 49999 60 16.81% 
4 50000 to 74999 110 30.81% 
5 75000 to 99999 64 17.93% 
6 100000 to 149999 56 15.69% 
7 above 150000 32 8.96% 
Level Education Frequency Percent 
1 Not a high school graduate 17 4.76% 
2 High school graduate 88 24.65% 
3 Some college, no degree 64 17.93% 
4 Associate degree 14 3.92% 
5 Bachelor degree 83 23.25% 
6 Master degree 51 14.29% 
7 Professional degree 26 7.28% 

























Land acre 1.409 0.484 -0.190 0.371 -0.244 0.245 
 (0.892) (0.384) (0.237) (0.282) (0.479) (0.243) 
Rent 
percentage 
0.109 -0.175 0.121 0.905
*
 0.272 0.325 
(0.634) (0.509) (0.474) (0.510) (0.904) (0.545) 
Surface water -0.271 1.094
**
 0.361 -0.501 0.493 -0.984
**
 







 0.0686 0.00423 0.190
**
 0.0286 -0.000484 





back to farm 
0.0997 -0.0137 0.0251 -0.0079 0.234 0.159 









 -0.517 0.373 







 0.377 1.361 -0.0261 
(0.376) (0.373) (0.415) (0.398) (1.118) (0.432) 
Farmers’ characteristics: 
Age -0.0180 -0.0170 0.00503 0.0155 0.0536
*
 -0.0198 
 (0.0154) (0.0142) (0.0133) (0.0151) (0.0290) (0.0158) 
Male 0.161 0.561 0.0153 0.340 0.259 -0.641 





 0.0584 0.129 -0.208 0.247
***
 
 (0.0893) (0.0759) (0.0735) (0.0823) (0.153) (0.0882) 
Income 0.0381 -0.0495 0.0485 0.113 0.0491 -0.0141 
 (0.112) (0.0970) (0.0919) (0.103) (0.180) (0.109) 
Farming 
experience 
-0.0145 0.00609 -0.0132 -0.0032 -0.00551 -0.00114 








 0.152 0.242 -0.0752 0.0739 
(0.309) (0.287) (0.267) (0.308) (0.544) (0.335) 




































 0.330 0.238 





 -0.0938 0.570 0.524 
 (0.546) (0.326) (0.326) (0.357) (0.554) (0.349) 
Water quality 0.0644 0.0634 0.0290 -0.0489 0.268 -0.140 






 0.0546 -0.0466 -0.185 0.308
**
 
(0.0925) (0.0980) (0.0869) (0.101) (0.186) (0.120) 
Target farmers:  
Beginning 
farmers 
-0.280 -0.473 -0.175 0.309 0.314 0.341 




0.181 -0.498 0.508 0.204 0.00737 0.273 
(0.679) (0.687) (0.595) (0.634) (1.167) (0.729) 
Current usage of other BMPs:  
Riparian 
buffers 
- - 0.389 0.436 0.651 0.503 
 - - (0.275) (0.299) (0.549) (0.323) 
Animal fences - 0.410 - 0.175 -0.352 0.283 
 - (0.281) - (0.299) (0.529) (0.321) 















- (0.525) (0.502) (0.559) - (0.548) 
Nutrient 
management 

















 (1.319) (1.248) (1.151) (1.308) (2.520) (1.343) 
N 357 357 357 357 357 357 
pseudo R
2
 0.267 0.195 0.161 0.227 0.252 0.228 






 imply significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 



































 (1.962) (2.193) (2.247) (2.014) (2.081) (2.464) 
Farms’ characteristics: 
Land acre -0.00196 -1.508 -2.655
**
 1.501 0.0782 -0.270 
 (0.393) (1.204) (1.292) (1.030) (0.326) (0.375) 
Rent 
percentage 
-0.786 2.324 -0.650 -2.586
**
 -0.645 0.428 
(1.056) (1.518) (1.124) (1.293) (1.059) (1.224) 














 0.132 -0.153 0.0752 





back to farm 
0.244 0.802
***
 0.0132 -0.142 0.662
***
 0.0984 










(0.612) (0.651) (0.726) (0.655) (0.564) (0.686) 
Farms with 
livestock 
-0.666 -0.856 0.266 -2.494
**
 -0.250 0.307 
(0.780) (0.844) (1.010) (0.971) (0.816) (1.205) 
Farmers’ characteristics: 




 0.00572 -0.0459 
 (0.0297) (0.0396) (0.0439) (0.0381) (0.0294) (0.0371) 





 (0.803) (1.045) (1.199) (1.048) (1.095) (1.167) 
Education 0.107 -0.0191 0.454
**
 0.00815 -0.0459 0.572
**
 
 (0.158) (0.177) (0.197) (0.180) (0.162) (0.239) 
Income 0.0177 0.153 0.0683 0.270 -0.410
*
 -0.0474 







 -0.0262 0.0354 




0.434 1.016 0.212 0.741 -0.996 1.480
**
 



















Environmental aspects:  
CRP - -0.0351 -1.446 -3.329
***
 1.038 1.757 
 - (0.827) (1.305) (1.070) (0.772) (1.262) 
WLP -0.742 -0.256 -0.309 -0.0914 0.753 -1.845
*
 









 -0.329 0.425 




0.520 -0.247 -1.615 -0.0479 1.223 1.824 




2.401 1.316 4.159 3.211 3.805
**
 2.611 
(1.921) (2.507) (3.849) (2.403) (1.866) (2.926) 
Experiences of BMPs:  
Current use 
any of BMPs 
2.450
***
 - - - - - 










- (0.791) (0.725) (0.690) (0.688) (0.717) 
Animal fence - -0.535 4.296
***
 0.313 -0.385 0.445 
 - (0.664) (1.035) (0.680) (0.654) (0.757) 
No till - 0.300 -0.637 4.390
***
 -0.448 1.211 





 2.780 -0.288 0.484 -4.179
***
 










- (0.822) (0.853) (0.875) (0.727) (0.913) 





 -0.0370 -0.648 2.152
**
 
- - (1.275) (0.753) (0.664) (0.972) 







- (0.831) - (0.796) (0.649) (0.807) 
No till - 1.566
*










 1.104 - 5.291
***
 










- (0.792) (0.901) (0.729) (0.743) - 





Table 2.6 Continued 


















 0.0480 0.278 1.927
*
 
(0.865) (0.853) (0.945) (0.763) (0.730) (1.018) 
Environmental 
aspect Info 
0.364 -0.362 -1.093 0.437 1.225 0.0265 
(0.750) (0.980) (0.956) (0.853) (0.832) (1.089) 
Combined 
Information 
0.335 0.763 -1.233 -0.941 0.366 1.879
*
 








 (3.261) (3.938) (3.476) (3.911) (3.573) (4.565) 
N 234 149 182 178 151 176 
pseudo R
2
 0.355 0.531 0.606 0.548 0.451 0.631 
 






 imply significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance levels, respectively. 





Table 2.7 Correlation between Current Usage and Future Choices of BMPs 
  Future choices of BMPs (Dependent variables) 
















Positive - Negative Positive - 
Animal 
fences 
- Positive - - - 




Negative - - - Negative 
Nutrient 
management 







Table 2.8 Correlation between Future and Future Choices of BMPs 



















- Positive - - Positive 
Animal fences 
 
Positive - Positive Positive - 
No till 
 
Positive - - Positive Positive 
Waste storage 
facilities 
- Positive - - Positive 
Nutrient 
management 






2.9 Figures in Chapter 2 
 






Figure 2.2 Probabilities of Implementing Animal Fences with or without Cost Saving 
Information  
 
Note: The probabilities of farmers implementing additional animal fences appear to be 
high. This is because the figure is created based at sample median.  A typical farmer in 
the sample is already having animal fences. According to our models, whether farmers 
have already implemented animal fences is one of the most important predictors on 
whether they will adopt in the future. As a result, these farmers are predicted by our 











































































































Chapter 3 Farmer Willingness to Engage in Best Management Practices: a 




    While in the previous chapter we examined whether farmers were willing to further 
reduce agricultural runoff and what are the factors affecting their choice, in this chapter, 
we investigate by how much farmers may be able to adopt additional BMPs on their land 
to generate trading credits. In this process, we consider specifically the impact of missing 
observations on the analysis by comparing different methods of treating the missing data.  
    We use the same survey as described in the previous chapter. The survey asked 
farmers questions about current BMPs implemented and the extent to which farmers 
would adopt more BMPs if compensated through WQT. The effect of farmers’ 
knowledge of WQT on BMP adoption was tested by giving different types of WQT-
related information to the respondents. Five BMPs were featured: riparian buffers, animal 
fences, no till, waste storage facilities, and nutrient management, and about 21.5%, 
26.9%, 24.2%, 23.2%, and 18.2% of respondents did not indicate how much they will 
adopt for each respective BMP. Addressing missing responses is crucial since missing 
data can lead to spurious interpretation of the data (Groves, 2006), especially when 
missing values constitute more than 5% of the data (Schafer, 1999). Given its prevalence 
in our survey, we also study the survey’s issues of missing values.  
    Missing data problems are common in surveys of farmers, and frequently occur in 
primary dataset collection. Weber and Clay (2013) replicate previous studies to compare 




comprehensive Census of Agriculture to its annual, but more limited Agricultural 
Resource Management Survey (ARMS), to study nonresponse issues in the latter. They 
conclude that nonresponse occurs because of time consumed and disutility from 
answering questions, and that larger farms are more likely to have missing values, 
consequentially having the most pronounced nonresponse bias. A conventional, naïve 
method to handle missing responses is to delete the observations with missing portions, 
known as listwise deletion. This method assumes that missing values are independent 
with the observed and unobserved data. This assumption is rarely satisfied in empirical 
studies and the listwise deletion method may lead to nonresponse bias (Lin and Schaeffer 
1995; Groves, 2006; Groves and Peytcheva, 2008).  
    In this study, we focus on two types of variables facing the issue of missing responses: 
a yes/no question of whether farmers would accept the offer to implement each of the 
BMPs, and, if yes, its follow-up question on how much farmers would adopt BMPs. In 
this research, we use Multiple Imputation (MI) to address the issue of missing data. MI, 
introduced by Rubin (1978), is a statistical method that imputes m plausible missing 
values for each missing observation to create m completed datasets; each completed 
dataset is analyzed using a separate statistical method such as regression. Averaging the 
m results, the point estimates, and covariance matrices using Rubin’s formula generates 
the final estimates of the model’s coefficients (Raghunathan et al. 2001; King, Honaker, 
Joseph and Scheve 2001). 
    This current study includes three methods to address missing data. The first simply 
deletes observations with missing responses. The second uses mean imputation to replace 




method, we use MI to impute missing responses in the willingness question and the 
follow-up question if farmers accepted the initial offer. Specifically, we apply a 
Multivariate Imputation by Chained Equation (MICE) method introduced by 
Raghunathan et al. (2001). The MICE method is preferred over the traditional, 
multivariate normal imputation method because it overcomes the multivariate normal 
imputation’s inability to impute discrete and continuous missing data simultaneously. In 
addition, MICE does not rely on the multivariate normality assumption, as does 
multivariate normal imputation. In our research, discrete and continuous missing data 
coexist, so the multivariate normality is invalid, further supporting the use of MICE. We 
use the MICE method under four different scenarios to impute missing data. The first 
scenario imputes missing responses in the follow-up question if farmers accepted the 
initial offer. The second, third, and fourth scenarios are multi-stage procedures that first 
impute missing responses in the yes/no question; then impute missing values in the 
follow-up question if the answer to the first question is recorded or imputed as yes. The 
specific procedures are introduced in the empirical strategy section. Given the imputed 
value, we estimate the factors affecting how much farmers may engage in BMPs using 
Tobit or Poisson regression, and combine the m results to derive final coefficient 
estimates.  
The next section describes the WQT survey and its missing value issues. We then 
introduce the theory of mechanisms to address missing data followed by a discussion of 
empirical strategies to address missing data in our survey and imputation procedures. The 





3.2 Survey and Missing Data Problem  
 
    The survey data were collected from randomly chosen farmers across 35 counties in 
the Kentucky River watershed from 2011 to 2012. The response rate was 23%. Out of the 
total returned 459 questionnaires, 357 contained at least some completed responses 
regarding to BMP-related questions and were used in the final analysis. Questions 
included farmer participation in current government-funded environmental or 
conservation programs, their potential adoption of additional BMPs through a WQT 
program, farm characteristics, and demographic characteristics. 
    The key BMP adoption questions asked farmers: “Regardless of whether you are 
currently participating in any government cost share programs, if you knew that by using 
water quality management practices on your land, a nearby waste/sewage water treatment 
plant or factory will cover X% of your cost of implementing these practices, would you 
be interested in using additional water quality management practices (BMPs) in the form 
of the following activities?” A table was given to each respondent listing five BMPs: 
riparian buffers, fencing off animals, no till, waste storage facility and nutrient 
management.” In the actual survey, X% is replaced by one of the following possible 
values with equal probability: 75%, 80%, 85%, 90%, 95%, 100%, 105%, 110%, 115% 
and 120%. Each respondent saw only one questionnaire and only one level of 
compensation. A respondent could answer “yes,” “no,” or “not possible for me” with 
respect to each practice. “Not possible for me” allows respondents to indicate if a specific 
BMP as not applicable on their land. 
    If respondents answered yes to adopt a BMP, the follow-up question asked “in addition 




The respondents provided exact values for how much they would adopt the practice (i.e. 
open-ended). The unit of measure for riparian buffers and animal fences is “feet;” an 
“acre” is the unit of measure unit for the practices of no till and nutrient management; and 
the measurement for the practices of waste storage facility is the number of installed 
“facilities.”  
The survey also included four different explanations and descriptions of WQT 
programs. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the information scenarios. 
This design examines whether the different levels of information may influence an 
individual’s response. The first information treatment gives a basic explanation of WQT 
programs with minimal interpretation of WQT programs. The second information 
treatment includes the information in the first, plus an additional description of WQT 
programs implied cost savings for farmers. The third type contains the baseline 
information and information emphasizes the environmental benefits from WQT programs. 
The fourth treatment provides both cost savings and environmental benefits information. 
As explained later, these treatments are an integral part of the imputation strategies. Table 
2.3 presents all variables and summary statistics for the entire sample. Table 2.4 explains 
discrete levels in explanatory variables. 
 
3.2.1 Missing Data Problem 
 
    We analyze missing responses to BMP adoption questions for three cases. Figure 3.1 
illustrates the three cases of missing responses in our survey. The first case is if 
respondents answered “no” or “not possible for me” to the yes/no question, then the 




reasons include if respondents refused to consider the BMPs (i.e. no), they are unable to 
implement the BMP on their land, or if they have already adopted BMPs as much as 
possible on their land. In these cases, the plausible value for the missing data in the 
follow-up question is “zero”, thus are no longer considered missing.  
The second case of missing data is when respondents answered “yes” to the yes/no 
question, but did not respond to how much they would increase the BMP on their land. 
Because respondents have already stated they would like to adopt the BMP, the plausible 
values for the missing data in the follow-up question should be some positive, continuous 
value for riparian buffers, animal fences, no till and nutrient management, and a discrete 
count for waste storage facilities.  
The third case includes the respondents who did not answer the yes-no BMP adoption 
question nor the follow-up adoption rate question. If respondents answered the yes/no 
question for at least one practice but not to the other practices, their responses to the other 
practices are treated as missing. In this third case, the plausible values for missing data in 
yes/no questions are either “yes,” “no,” or “not possible for me;” if respondents actually 
answered “yes” to the yes/no questions or are imputed to be “yes,” then the plausible 
values for the quantitative questions are the same as in the second case. If respondents did 
not answer any of the five yes/no BMP adoption questions, we exclude them from the 
analysis entirely, treating them as uninterested and unwilling market participants. In this 
research, we address the issue of missing data in the last two cases. Table 3.1 summarizes 




3.3 Theory of Missing Mechanism and the Multivariate Imputation by Chained 
Equation 
 
3.3.1 Missing Mechanism  
 
    This section formally introduces the mechanism of the three types of missing data. 
Let Y denote a variable with missing data, X denotes a vector of variables completely 
answered, and R be an indicator variable that equals one if Y is missing and zero if Y is 
observed. The first type of missing data is Missing Completely at Random (MCAR), and 
is defined as  
Pr(𝑅 = 1|𝑋, 𝑌) = Pr(𝑅 = 1)                                                                       (3.1) 
MCAR implies that missing data do not depend on any observed or unobserved 
variables. If the MCAR mechanism applies, the listwise deletion method that deletes the 
observations with missing data is the most efficient strategy to address missing values. 
However, the MCAR rarely holds in empirical analyses because it suggests that missing 
responses arise completely by chance (Kenward and Carpenter 2007). 
The second type of missing data is Missing at Random (MAR), represented as  
Pr(𝑅 = 1|𝑋, 𝑌) = Pr(𝑅 = 1| 𝑋)                                                                            
or  Pr(𝑅 = 1|𝑋, 𝑌) = Pr(𝑅 = 1| 𝑌𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑)                                                   (3.2) 
    MAR assumes that the probability of missing is related to the observed data, but not to 
unobservable data. Empirical research commonly assumes MAR, and it is the 
fundamental assumption for most imputation methods. If MAR holds, a variety of 
methods can address the missing data, such as the Hot Deck method, MI, Full 




    The third type of missing data is Missing Not at Random (MNAR). It implies that the 
probability of being missing is related to the unobserved value in the missing variable. 
Verifying MNAR is impossible unless we obtain the unobserved value or other external 
information beyond the survey. Current strategies to deal with MNAR missing are 
complex, and the results are sensitive to the methods chosen (Allison 2012). Although 
various studies have introduced and developed solutions to the MNAR problem, there is 
no general agreement on the best approach, and only Heckman-type modelling may 
alleviate the MNAR missing data issue (Grittner et al. 2011).  
    Following the previous empirical studies in health, medical, environmental and 
household areas (Van Buuren, Boshuizen and Knook 1999; Schenker et al 2006; Burgette 
and Reiter 2010; Azur, Stuart, Frangakis and Leaf 2011; White, Royston and Wood 2011; 
Miyama and Managi 2014), we assume MAR applies in our research for several reasons. 
First, MCAR is an inefficient assumption in empirical research. Even if the MCAR 
assumption is satisfied, imputation based on MAR mechanisms will not bias the analysis 
(Little and Rubin 1989). Second, as mentioned above, the MNAR assumption cannot be 
justified without obtaining the unobserved value. Even if a discernable pattern of missing 
values appears to follow MNAR, we cannot test the performance of those methods for 
MNAR since the missing data are not observable. The results may also significantly 
change depending on the correction method used. Weber and Clay (2013) find that a 
sample selection model does not reduce nonresponse bias from the ARMS data. A simple 
and plausible method to handle MNAR is to still use the imputation method under the 
MAR assumption, but include as many predictor variables as possible (Miyama and 




chance the missing data are correlated with predictor variables, thus it may convert the 
missing mechanism from MNAR to MAR.  
    Finally, we tested whether nonresponses are related to the observed variables. We 
created an indicator variable denoting observations with missing data, treating this 
indicator as the dependent variable and all observed variables as independent variables. 
Next, we estimated a logit model to test whether any relationships exist between the 
nonresponse indicator and observed explanatory variables. The results show that 
nonresponses were correlated with several observed variables, so the MCAR assumption 
fails.  
    Given the MAR assumption, MI is useful to deal with missing data issues, outlined in 
the following steps (van Buuren, Boshuizen, and Knook 1999): 
(1) Identify the missing variables, the posterior predictive density, and predictor 
variables given the MAR assumption. 
(2) Draw m plausible values for the missing data from the density to generate m 
complete datasets. 
(3) Conduct m complete-data analyses for each of the m complete datasets. 
(4) Combine the m data analyses into one estimate with final m estimates. 
Rubin (1976) first introduced MI to analyze the nonresponse issue in survey data, and 
numerous statisticians have worked to improve MI (Andrew Gelman, Gary King, 
Roderick JA. Little, Xiao Li Meng, Trivellore E. Raghunathan, Patrick Royston, Donald 
B. Rubin, Joseph L. Schafer, Stef van Buurenand, Ian R. White ), aiding its growth in 




MI is that it considers the true variance of data because missing values are imputed with 
different plausible values and are averaged to conclude a final estimate.  
 
3.3.2 The MICE Method 
 
    In this research, we apply the MI method using multivariate imputation by chain 
equation (MICE), introduced by van Buuren, Boshuizen and Knook (1999) and 
Raghunathan et al. (2001), to impute categorical and continuous variables simultaneously 
and without the multivariate normal assumption. MICE decomposes the multivariate 
problem into a series of univariate problems using an iteration algorithm. The procedure 
is displayed in Figure 3.2, and is demonstrated as follows (van Buuren, Boshuizen and 
Knook 1999; Raghunathan et al. 2001; Schenker et al. 2006; Azur et al. 2011): 
Let 𝑋  denote variables fully observed, and 𝑌(1), 𝑌(2), … , 𝑌(𝑛)  denote k variables with 
missing data, ordered by the amount of missing data from the least to the most.  
(1) In iteration 1, regress observed 𝑌(1)on 𝑋, and impute the missing values of 𝑌(1) 
using the predicted distribution based on the fitted regression. Then, regress  𝑌(2) 
on X plus the observed value and recently imputed values of 𝑌(1), and impute the 
missing values of 𝑌(2). For 𝑌(𝑘), regress 𝑌(𝑘) on X, 𝑌(1), 𝑌(2), … , 𝑌(𝑘−1) where 
𝑌(1) , 𝑌(2) , … ,  𝑌(𝑘−1)  include observed value and all of imputed value, then 
impute 𝑌(𝑘) using predictive distribution based on the fitted regression of 𝑌(𝑘). 
Repeat this procedure until all incomplete variables 𝑌(𝑛) are imputed.  
(2) Iteration 2: the imputation process is repeated in the same manner as round 1, but 




imputed. To be specific, regress imputed values in iteration 1 and observed values 
of 𝑌(1)on 𝑋  𝑌(2), 𝑌(3), … , 𝑌(𝑛), where  𝑌(2), 𝑌(3), … , 𝑌(𝑛) are imputed in last 
round, and re-impute the missing values of 𝑌(1)  using predictive distribution 
based on the fitted regression. Regress  𝑌(2)  on X and 𝑌(1) , 𝑌(3) , … ,  𝑌(𝑛) 
including observed value and imputed value, where 𝑌(1)  is the most recent 
imputed value and 𝑌(3), … , 𝑌(𝑛) are imputed in last round; and then re-impute 
the missing values of 𝑌(2). For 𝑌(𝑘), regress 𝑌(𝑘) on X, 𝑌(1), 𝑌(2), … , 𝑌(𝑘−1), 
𝑌(𝑘+1), … , 𝑌(𝑛) where  𝑌(1), 𝑌(2), … , 𝑌(𝑘−1) are the most recent imputed value 
in current iteration and 𝑌(𝑘+1) , … , 𝑌(𝑛)  are from the imputed value in last 
iteration; then re-impute 𝑌(𝑘)  using predictive distribution based on the fitted 
regression of 𝑌(𝑘) . This procedure is executed c iterations until the equation 
chains converge. 
   MICE allows the use of different models in each regression. If 𝑌(𝑘) is a continuous 
variable, a normal linear regression is suitable; if 𝑌(𝑘)  is a binary variable, logistic 
regression is preferable; if 𝑌(𝑘) is a categorical variable with more than two outcomes, a 
polytomous regression model is appropriate; if 𝑌(𝑘)  is a count outcome, a Poisson 
loglinear regression, a negative binomial regression, or a Predictive Mean Matching 
(PMM) method are appropriate models, where the PMM method imputes predicted 
values by matching them with the observed values of the variable (Little, 1988). If 𝑌(𝑘) is 
mixed, such as a semi-continuous outcome, a two-stage model is applied. To be specific, 
it first uses a logistic regression to impute zero and non-zero status, and then uses a 
normal linear regression model to impute non-zero values for the non-zero group. We 




corresponding computation procedure introduced in Raghunathan et al (2001). Appendix 
3.1 shows model specifications used in our study. 
 
3.4 Empirical Strategy Dealing with Missing Response 
 
    Given the MAR assumption, we use the deletion method, the mean imputation method, 
and the MICE method to treat missing data for each BMP. In addition, we apply the 
MICE method with four scenarios to discuss different imputation strategies. The four 
scenarios are as follows:  
(1) One-stage MICE: Only addresses missing responses in the follow-up questions 
when respondents answered “yes” to the choice questions, but failed to answer the 
follow-up questions.  
(2) Two-stage MICE: Considers missing data issues in both the yes/no questions and 
in the follow-up quantity questions. We first impute missing responses in the 
choice questions with “yes” “no” and “not possible for me.” For respondents who 
answered or were imputed as “yes,” we then impute missing observations of the 
follow-up questions. The imputation processes used for the two missing variables 
are simultaneous.  
(3) Two-stage MICE with restriction: Similar to scenario two, but this time it 
assumes that missing choices are more likely to be “no” or “not possible for me.” 
Therefore, we first impute missing choices as either “no” or “not possible for me,” 
then impute the missing data in the follow-up questions using MICE. 
(4) Three-stage MICE: In this case, we recognize the fact that the outcome “not 




we first impute whether it was possible for the respondents to adopt a BMP, but 
who did not answer the yes/no questions; then for the “possible” group, we 
impute missing choices as either “yes” or “no;” finally for respondents who 
answered or were imputed as “yes,” we impute missing data in the follow-up 
questions. These steps were also computed simultaneously using the MICE 
method. 
 
3.4.1 MICE Scenario 1: One-Stage Imputation   
 
The first scenario imputes missing responses to each BMP’s follow-up question. For 
respondents who answered “No,” the missing value is replaced by zero because they 
would not adopt BMPs. For the respondents who answered “Yes” but did not indicate 
how much they would adopt, we impute the missing values with respect to the five BMPs 
simultaneously using the MICE algorithm.  
    For predictor variables 𝑋 , we follow a general rule that the number of predictors 
should be as large as possible (van Buuren, Boshuizen and Knook, 1999) to improve the 
possibility the MAR condition is satisfied. Furthermore, using all of the information 
increases the precision of prediction, and decreases imputation bias. The goal of 
imputation is to predict the distribution of a missing variable, and the imputations are 
drawn from the posterior distribution of the imputed variable, but do not change the joint 
distribution (Schafer 1997; King, Honaker, Joseph and Scheve, 2001). In addition, 
imputation algorithms do not require causality between predictor and imputed variables.  
However, White, Royston and Wood (2011) state that imputation models that include 




imputation models. Van Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn (2011) recommend no more 
than 15 to 25 variables. Given this debate, we choose the following predictor variables: 
the levels of compensation, land size, rent percentage, having surface water on the farm, 
percentage of household income from farming, total household income reinvested back to 
farm, types of farming production, age, gender, education, income, race, water recreation 
activities, farming experience, water quality near the farm, participation in government 
programs, current usage of different types of BMPs, and the four different WQT 
information treatments. For the riparian buffer, animal fence, no till, and nutrient 
management BMPs, the imputation uses a linear regression model because imputed 
variables are continuous. Waste storage facilities are added in discrete quantities, so we 
impute missing values based on the Poisson regression.  
 
3.4.2 MICE Scenario 2: Two-Stage Imputation  
     
The second scenario imputes missing values both in the yes/no question and in each 
BMP’s follow-up question on the intended amount of adoption. The possible responses to 
the yes/no questions are “yes,” “no,” or “not possible for me.” If the answer is yes, the 
possible response to the adoption question is a positive, continuous value. If it is no, 
adoption is zero. Therefore, we impute “yes,” “no,” or “not possible for me” for the 
missing data in the yes/no question using a multinomial logit model; then examine only 
the “yes” group. We impute missing data in the follow-up question. The imputation steps 




(1) Missing data in the yes/no questions are imputed as discrete values such as “yes,” 
“no,” or “not possible for me” with respect to each BMP. 
(2) For respondents who answered “no,” the missing data in the follow-up questions 
are replaced by zero; for respondents who were imputed to answer “no,” the 
missing data are also replaced by zero.  
(3) For respondents who answered “yes,” but did not answer how much they would 
implement, or respondents who were imputed to answer “yes,” their missing 
responses in the follow-up questions are imputed by MI using each BMP’s 
appropriate models.  
 
3.4.3 MICE Scenario 3: Two-Stage Imputation with Restriction 
 
    The third scenario is similar to the second in that it imputes missing values both in the 
yes/no question and the follow-up question for each practice using a two-stage approach, 
but restricts the missing values in the yes/no question to be only “no” or “not possible for 
me.”  This is more conservative by assuming that missing responses to the yes/no 
question are more likely to be a “no” or “not possible for me.”  
    We first impute the missing values to be either “no” or “not possible for me” in the 
yes/no question using the logistic regression model; then restrict the sample to the “yes” 
group and impute missing values for the follow-up question. The imputation steps are 
described in Figure 3.4, and outlined as follows:  
(1) Missing values for each BMP’s yes/no questions are imputed as discrete values 




(2) For respondents who answered or who were imputed to answer “no” and “not 
possible for me,” the missing data in the follow-up questions are replaced by zero.  
(3) Among respondents who answered “yes” but did not answer how much they 
would like to implement BMPs, their missing responses in the follow-up 
questions are imputed using each BMP’s corresponding model.  
 
3.4.4 MICE Scenario 4: Three-Stage Imputation  
 
    Scenario 4 carefully considers the nature of the missing response of the yes/no 
question. “Not possible for me” is principally different from yes and no. “Yes” and “no” 
represent a personal preference to implement BMPs given the compensation through 
WQT programs, but “not possible for me” implies a farm cannot implement a practice, 
regardless of their preferences. As a result, we first determine farm capability by using a 
logistic regression model to impute the missing response as “possible” or “not possible.” 
For those imputed as “possible,” we then impute “yes” and “no” using the logistic 
regression model again; and for the sample who either answered “yes” initially or were 
imputed to answer “yes,” we impute missing data of the question on the adoption rate. 
The imputation steps are described in Figure 3.5, and are outlined as follows:   
(1) Missing data in the yes/no questions are imputed as either “possible” or “not 
possible for me” with respect to each BMP using logistic regression. 
(2) For respondents who were imputed to be “possible,” we re-impute the BMPs with 
missing responses with “yes” or “no” using a logistic regression model.  
(3) For respondents who answered or were imputed to answer “not possible for me,” 




who answered or were imputed to answer “no,” the missing data in the follow-up 
questions are replaced by zero; 
(4) For respondents who answered or were imputed to answer “yes” to the yes/no 
questions, but did not answer how much they would like to implement BMPs, 
missing responses in the follow-up questions are imputed.  
Appendix 3.2 provides the detailed imputation model and predictors for the four MICE 
scenarios.  
 
3.5 Imputation  
 
3.5.1 Fitting the Imputation Model 
  
    During imputation, normal linear regression model requires the normality assumption 
for observed values to predict value X. When the observed values are highly skewed, the 
normal linear regression model is invalid. Following Royston and White (2011), we 
apply a shifted log transformation to the observed value of missing data in order to satisfy 
the normality assumption. This process transforms the observed value in variable 𝑦 into a 
log form toward normality using equation 3.3 where 𝑦𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 is the log-transformed non-
missing values, 𝑦𝑜𝑏𝑠  is the value of non-missing 𝑦 , and 𝑘  is an estimated parameter 
indicating skewness. If 𝑦𝑜𝑏𝑠 is negatively skewed, the sign in front of 𝑦𝑜𝑏𝑠 in equation 3.3 
is negative, otherwise it is positive. After imputation, we use the inverse transformation 
in equation 3.4 to convert observed and imputed values of variable 𝑦 back to the original 
scale, and label it as 𝑦𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑.  




𝑦𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑 =  ∓(𝑒
𝑦𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚+𝑦𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 𝑘 )                                                       (3.4) 
    In our research, the issue of perfect prediction occurs in several models. Perfect 
prediction arises when covariate variables can perfectly predict outcomes of the 
categorical data (Albert and Anderson, 1984). As a result, the imputation cannot be 
executed because the estimation has infinite coefficients with infinite standard errors. 
Categorical data is more likely to have the perfect prediction issue (White, Daniel, and 
Royston, 2011), especially for logit and multinomial logit models. One can ‘diagnose’ the 
models by identifying and removing the covariates causing perfect prediction. However, 
removing a potential troublesome variable can potentially mislead the imputation because 
omitting a key determinant leads to a biased result. An alternative strategy uses an 
augmented-regression approach introduced by White, Daniel, and Royston (2010). We 
apply the augment approach in all imputation models with categorical data. 
We use 30 iterations as the burn-in period. Specifying additional burn-in iterations did 
not change the results. For waste storage facilities, a PMM method was used in the 
simulation, instead of the Poisson model, to achieve convergence.  
 
3.5.2 After Imputation 
     
    After imputing missing values for each BMP’s follow-up quantity question, we 
replaced imputed extreme values, values exceeding the minimum and maximum of the 
observed data, by the corresponding minimum and maximum of each BMP. These 




    With each imputed dataset, we estimate the factors affecting how much farmers may 
engage in each BMP, specified by equation 3.5 using Tobit or Poisson regressions. The 
dependent variable, 𝑌𝑖, is how much farmers would like to implement each of the BMPs. 
For Riparian buffer 𝑌1 , Animal fence 𝑌2 , No till 𝑌3  and Nutrient management 𝑌5 , the 
dependent variables is continuous if the decision is “yes,” and zero if the decision is “no.” 
Because usage of BMPs is censored at zero, we use Tobit model to estimate how much 
farmers may implement these practices. Since the dependent variable for waste storage 
facilities 𝑌4  is a count value, we estimate how many facilities may be adopted using 
Poisson regression. We exclude respondents who answered “not possible for me” from 
the analysis.  
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑋
′𝛽 +                                                                                                      (3.5) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑠 Yes, 𝑖 = 1,2,3,5                      
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑠 Yes, 𝑖 = 4                                    
𝑌𝑖 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑠 "𝑁𝑜"                                                                         
Previous studies show mixed results of factors affecting choices and rates of using BMP. 
Two syntheses of BMP adoption conclude that there is no factor that can explain BMP 
adoption consistently (Knowler and Bradshaw 2007; Prokopy et al. 2008). Baumgart-
Getz, Prokopy, and Floress (2012) conduct a meta-analysis to understand why farmers 
adopt BMPs, and they conclude that farmers’ environmental awareness and attitudes are 
important factors, but researchers must carefully define and use these indicators. 
Following previous syntheses of BMP adoption, we select the following explanatory 
variables to explain BMP adoption in our case: compensation, land area, rent area 




from farming, total household income reinvested back into the farm, income, nearby 
water quality, participation in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), and Working-
Land Program (WLP). Each BMP’s regression utilizes the same explanatory variables. 
We also examine the cross-effect of BMP adoption by including the current use of the 
five types of BMPs to explain adoption. Finally, to examine whether synergy exists in 
adopting BMPs, we include the respondent’s decision to adopt one practice as an 
explanatory variable in the adoption of the others.  
    The last step of MI is to calculate the m estimation results using Rubin’s method 
(Rubin 1987). Let 𝑄 denote a parameter estimate, such as a regression coefficient, in each 
imputed dataset. The point estimate 𝑄 of 𝑄 is the average of the m separate estimates, 







                                                                                                   (3.6) 
Let 𝑈𝑗 denote the estimated squared standard error of 𝑄𝑗 written as equation 3.7, and 𝐵 
denote the between-imputation variance across the m point estimates written as equation 















                                                                             (3.8) 
𝑇 = (1 +
1
𝑚
) 𝐵 + 𝑈                                                                                        (3.9) 
The tests and confidence intervals follow a Student’s t-approximation  (𝑄 − 𝑄) √𝑇⁄ ~𝑡𝑣 










]                                                              (3.10) 
    Previous studies have shown that, after convergence, five or ten imputations are 
sufficient unless there is a severe degree of missing data. However, White, Royston and 
Wood (2011) argue for larger numbers of imputation m due to efficiency loss and 
reproducibility. Since the variance of parameters is calculated using equation 3.9, they 
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 is the fraction of missing information (FMI) (Schafer 1997).  
If we allow 1% loss of efficiency in our imputation, 1 +
𝐹𝑀𝐼
𝑚
 should be less than or equal 
to 1.01, then  
𝐹𝑀𝐼
𝑚
 ≤ 0.01. FMI is calculated after the analytic model using imputation 
data, and can be obtained from most statistical software packages. So the imputation 
times m are greater or equal to (100 ∗ 𝐹𝑀𝐼) if we allow 1% loss of efficiency in our 
analysis. In the estimation, each parameter has its own FMI. We use the largest FMI 
value to determine m. This also improves the reproducibility of our imputation, regardless 
of “seeds” or software packages. Intuitively, a larger m improves similarity in reproduced 









The imputation procedure is executed using the “rseed” option in Stata 12.0. Income 
level, percentage of household income from farming, and total household income 
reinvested back to farm are variables with categorical values, and in order to improve 
coefficient interpretation, are converted to continuous variables by using the midpoint of 
each corresponding category (Appendix 3.3). Tables 3.2-3.6 display the results of Tobit 
or Poisson models of how much farmers may increase BMP use given the offered amount 
of compensation.
5
 Each table compares the results of all six imputation methods per BMP. 
The largest FMI values for each model are reported at the bottom of respective tables.  
 
3.6.1 Assessment of Imputation 
     
    For each BMP, the significance of coefficients is largely consistent across all six 
methods. The deletion method and mean imputation method produce more similar results 
than the four MICE scenarios. The magnitude of the statistically significant coefficients 
using mean imputation is smaller compared to the deletion method. This is because 
replacing missing values by a constant decreases the variability of data; i.e., increase 
central tendency of the distribution of the data. As a result, the mean imputation method 
may potentially distort the efficiency of the estimation, and even lead to biased results. In 
addition, the one-stage imputation, two-stage imputation, and two-stage imputation with 
                                                            
5
 We conducted a regression-based procedure in the first scenario to test overdispersion 
in the Poisson model (Cameron and Trivedi, 1990), and the result did not suggest 
overdispersion. Since the MI method does not change the distribution of data, tests of 
overdispersion will be consistent before and after imputation. Therefore, we use the 




restriction are mostly consistent with each other. The three-stage imputation departs from 
all others.  
In this analysis, we use results from the one-stage imputation method to examine 
whether farmers may be able to reduce agricultural runoff; what factors may affect their 
ability to do so; and how much more they would adopt each BMP. First, as discussed 
before, MI is theoretically equivalent to or better than the deletion or mean imputation 
method with the MCAR or MAR assumption, so for the last four, MICE methods are 
preferable over the first deletion and mean imputation.  
Second, the extra steps we take to determine whether a farm is able to adopt BMPs or 
whether they would like to use a BMP can also be a strong assumption, which may cause 
unreasonable results. Abayomi, Gelman and Levy (2008) conclude that the deviations 
between the imputed and observed data can be expected under MAR assumption, but 
researchers should be especially careful of extreme departures. Following van Buuren 
and Groothuis-Oudshoorn (2011) and Azur, Stuart, Frangakis and Leaf (2011), we 
examine the distribution of the observed and imputed data visually, and find that the one-
stage has less departures from the observed data than two strategies, and is also the most 
stable imputation across all scenarios (see Appendix 3.4).  
In addition, the One-stage and the Two-stage with restricted imputation have less FMI 
values than the other two scenarios. The FMI value represents the fraction of missing 
information. In other words, for a given fixed percent of efficiency loss from the 
imputation, the greater FMI is, the more imputation times m needed (White, Royston and 
Wood, 2011). Therefore, under the same imputation time, a smaller FMI value implies 




imputation generally performs better than the others because its imputed value has less 
variations and lower FMI across the five BMPs. Lastly, presenting the one-stage 
imputation provides a more conservative result, because it assumes MAR, so less 
distortionary than any other scenarios.  
Finally, comparing with the deletion method, results using the one-stage imputation 
method are reasonable, and are consistent with the results in the chapter 2.  For the model 
of riparian buffers, results in the deletion method show that if farmers are currently using 
animal fences, they are less likely to adopt additional riparian buffers. In opposite, results 
in chapter 2 and in the one-stage imputation method consistently show that current 
adoption of animal fences cannot affect farmers’ choices of riparian buffers.  In addition, 
results in the deletion method show that cost saving information will discourage the 
adoption of riparian buffer, but this result is contradicted with chapter 2 and those in the 
one-stage imputation. Similarly, we also find that several results are opposite to results in 
chapter 2 after using the deletion method, while results after using one-stage imputation 
are mostly consistent with chapter 2. All in all, both theory and empirical results provide 
evidence that one-stage imputation is preferred to other strategies.  
 
3.6.2 Additional Abatement     
 
Table 3.7 shows the average marginal effect of the coefficients from the one-stage 
imputation. Using a Tobit model for riparian buffers, animal fences, no till, and nutrient 
management means the average marginal effect is calculated as 𝐹(𝑋′𝛽) ∗ 𝛽 (McDonald 
and Moffitt, 1980). Waste storage facilities utilizes a Poisson model, so the average 




standard error using the delta method for each imputation, we apply Rubin’s method 
(equation 3.6 – 3.9) to derive a final estimate of marginal effects in the One-stage 
imputation. Table 3.7 contains these results. 
All else equal, a 1% increase in compensation for adopting riparian buffers will lead to 
an increase of adoption by an average of 22.05 feet. Farms with one additional acre are 
predicted to decrease adoption of animal fences by 1.48 feet. The result shows that 
holding the compensation level constant, larger farms are less likely to build up fences to 
keep animals from direct access to streams.  One possible reason is that the expected 
expenses of adopting fences for large farms are larger on average relative to small farms. 
In addition, an interesting finding is that for farms larger than 280 acres (the sample 
mean), the average percentage of rented land is about 28%, while the mean for farms 
with less than 280 acres is about 8%. It implies that farmers who operate on more land 
are also more likely to operate on rented land, and are less likely to make capital 
investments, such as in animal fences.  
If farmers receive more revenue from farming, they are more likely to adopt no till, 
and a 1% increase of household income from farming will encourage farmers to adopt no 
till on 0.81 more acres. In addition to the environmental benefits of no till, farmers also 
obtain economic benefits, such as lower fuel and labor costs. The time saved from no till 
means farmers can work on other tasks to improve crop production (Huggins and 
Reganold, 2008). Therefore, investing in no till is more likely to concurrently improve 
farm production, soil quality, and farming revenue in the long term. Farmers who reinvest 




storage facilities. A 1% increase in total household income reinvested back into the farm 
will increase the adoption of riparian buffers by an additional 17.74 feet.  
In addition to generating an environmental benefit, previous studies show that riparian 
buffers generate positive economic value and can increase property value (Qiu, Prato, and 
Boehm, 2006; Bin, Landry, and Meyer 2009). This property premium may explain why 
survey respondents choose it as an investment. On the other hand, building a waste 
storage facility has less economic return and higher construction and maintenance costs. 
Nevertheless, a waste storage facility will significantly improve environmental quality by 
diverting agricultural runoff from entering watersheds, and eventually provide economic 
advantages to farmers via nearby environmental amenities. Hence, building a facility is a 
long-term investment decision, and farms with higher household income reinvested back 
into their farms are more likely to build a waste storage facility.      
    One of the most important findings of this study is that previous BMP adoption 
significantly affects farmer adoption of additional BMPs. Holding other factors constant, 
farmers already using riparian buffers will adopt 1066.69 more feet of riparian buffers 
and apply nutrient management to 46.27 more acres relative to farmers not using buffers. 
Compared to farmers who have not adopted, farmers who already employ animal fences 
will increase animal fences by 995.95 acres. Similarly, farmers currently using no till are 
likely to adopt 1333.91 additional feet of animal fences and 63.81 acres of no till. If 
farmers already have a waste storage facility, they will reduce the practice of no till on 
59.65 acres. Farmers currently using nutrient management will reduce animal fences by 




explanation is that respondents’ willingness to use environmental goods is influenced by 
their previous experiences about the goods (Cameron and Englin, 1997).   
    We find that the type of information has a significant impact on farmers’ BMP 
adoption decisions. Compared to no additional information on WQT, the results also 
show that the WQT information treatment with augmented cost saving information 
induced farmers to adopt animal fences by an additional 842.86 feet; in contrast, the 
information about the environmental aspect did not influence BMP adoption. It implies 
that if policy makers wish to promote a WQT program or induce additional BMP 
adoption, they should scrutinize the type of information communicated with the farmers.  
Table 3.7 also reveals the synergy between the decisions to adopt different types of 
BMPs. Certain sets of BMPs are often practiced together. First, farmers willing to use 
riparian buffers are more likely to adopt animal fences, and vice versa. Both practices’ 
adjacency to surface water to prevent agricultural pollution from reaching water 
resources may explain the correlation. Buffers intercept agricultural runoff from crop 
production to remove pesticides and phosphorus, while fences prevent animals from 
accessing surface water. Another reason is that most respondents in our sample have both 
crop and livestock on their land. This bundled choice of BMPs verifies that farmers tend 
to implement similar practices together when they decide to adopt BMPs on their land.  
Farmers willing to build waste storage facilities also tend to implement nutrient 
management systems. Both practices reduce pollution generated from production from 
reaching water resources; waste storage facilities store agricultural wastes such as manure 
in a confined area (NRCS, 2003), while nutrient management focuses on strategic use of 





(NRCS Technical Resources). The U.S. Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) 
offers guidelines for farmers and ranchers to use waste storage facilities and nutrient 
management together as a comprehensive management plan (NRCS, 2015). Our results 
are consistent with NRCS’s guidelines, indicating that farmers are more likely to manage 
nutrients and runoff using a comprehensive plan through a WQT program.      
 
3.7 Conclusion  
    
    This study explores whether farmers in Kentucky would like to reduce agricultural 
runoff by adopting additional BMPs subject to the compensation paid by buyers of water 
quality credits through WQT, and which factors affect the decision. Roughly a fifth to a 
quarter of respondents did not indicate the amount adopted for the five BMPs 
investigated. We apply six approaches to address the missing data issues, the deletion 
method, the mean imputation method, the one-stage method using MICE, the two-stage 
method using MICE, the two-stage method using MICE with restriction, and the three-
stage method using MICE. To varying degrees, these methods improve the estimation of 
how factors affect how much farmers employ BMPs on their lands.  
    Our findings show that the compensation from WQT programs, socioeconomics 
characteristics, farm physical characteristics, and WQT-related information influence 
frequencies of BMP adoption. For example, a 1% increase in the compensation offered 
for using BMPs encourages farmers to adopt an additional 22 feet of riparian buffers. In 
addition, land area, percentage of household income from farming, percentage of total 
household income reinvested back to farm, and current experience of BMPs all affect 




animal fences, and between waste storage facilities and nutrient management. The pairs 
tend to be adopted together by farmers. We also find that the WQT information treatment 
with augmented cost saving information induced farmers to adopt animal fences. 
    Although MI was introduced over 20 years ago, and has become an established method 
in political science, medical science and behavior science, many researchers still rely on 
the deletion method for missing data in agricultural surveys. We show that replacing the 
missing data with MI-generated values enhances the economic analysis and implications. 
While our research does not intend to offer a normative strategy, the MI method shows 
promise to specifically handle missing data for surveys involving farming decisions. The 
comparison between several popular schemes offers insights on their relative efficacy to 
address missing data. As a conservative strategy, we recommend dealing with missing 
data by providing results from both the deletion method and the MI method. The mean 
imputation method is not advisable as it may not generate results as reliable as the other 
methods especially when the researcher is uncertain about the underlying reasons for the 






3.8 Tables in Chapter 3 
 















37 71 68 45 78 
Yes-No Amount 32 49 43 25 32 
No 80 62 67 81 66 
Not Possible 70 60 49 69 38 
Missing 138 115 130 137 143 



















Offer 148.39 1220.14 5844.58
*




(1774.11) (1033.83) (3254.79) (3214.25) (3027.58) (3056.01) 
Land acre -456.93 -276.9 -926.19 -737.95 -583.55 -125.84 
 
(856.22) (325.95) (1196.95) (1084.06) (946.81) (767.96) 
Rent 
percentage 
580.55 -71.66 814.53 1138.14 324.07 -25.76 
(1077.33) (595.01) (1814.07) (1623.91) (1589.47) (1645.31) 
Surface 
water 
1202.77 117.48 664.56 116.78 147.55 344.27 
(935.51) (481.15) (1257.14) (1180.68) (1192.79) (1119.89) 
HH Income 5.49 -2.59 -2.73 -3.82 -3.34 -5.01 





-1895.26 -1149.35 -3013.64 -2667.28 -3300.94
*
 -1980.11 














(1423.19) (864.28) (2485.1) (2124.31) (2346.65) (2325.5) 
Water 
quality 
-217.65 -134.7 -58.25 143.91 -247.15 13.89 
(187.78) (115.17) (309.29) (257.06) (289.95) (279.94) 
CRP -452.92 237.62 1274.44 544.59 1242.17 1019.14 
 
(772.65) (454.84) (1253.61) (1177.28) (1207.5) (1317.42) 
WLP 1065.28 276.65 -743.54 -81.66 -89.58 -497.1 
 
(643.69) (352.12) (1116.72) (1016.35) (1072.98) (1005.95) 























 -1173.39 -1269.11 -1324.06 -248.89 
(611.44) (369.24) (1050.72) (1008.1) (911.06) (1026.49) 
No till -731.74 184.27 1119.03 995.1 1308.1 1612.13 
 






 -2363.07 -1991.94 -2142.06 -3440.22
*
 




-275 -170.88 -449.41 -823.09 -3.8 -789.36 



































(679.85) (383.24) (1209.22) (1275.85) (1122.78) (858.18) 
No till 283.72 290.42 1098.67 1366.6 1365.59 421.93 
 






 -1359.29 -1241.41 -1702.55 -57.96 
(719.85) (415.1) (1308.26) (1087.33) (1248.52) (1060.42) 
Nutrient 
manage 
601.73 218.56 427.57 800.82 966.3 452 
(693.89) (344.1) (1133.87) (1010.98) (1108.74) (937.01) 







 -494.17 -582.07 -268.14 -179.45 -539.6 





-127.62 164.53 664.12 550.4 1188.01 187.72 





-448.68 -321.88 -346.48 -139.22 -292.91 -271.78 
(624.82) (415.97) (1213.4) (991.47) (1012.88) (1069.11) 

























(203.13) (120.2) (682.62) (586.06) (588.63) (567.43) 
N 119 149 149 225 199 218 
    256 237 251 
Largest 
FMI 
- - 0.8199 0.8859 0.7452 0.8211 
Note:  
(1) The “yes/no” choices are imputed in the last three scenarios, so numbers of 
observations used in the estimation varied across different imputation data. We report the 
smallest (upper row) and the largest numbers (lower row) of observations used in the 
estimation for the last three scenarios. Tables 3.3-3.6 also report the two numbers.   






 imply 10%, 5%, and 1% significance 
levels, respectively. 
(3) In (*), nutrient management abbreviates to nutrient manage for formatting the result 
in the one table; Cost info, environ Info, and combo info indicate cost saving information, 
environmental aspect information and combined information. Tables 3.3-3.7 also use the 




















Offer 1469.02 1057.82 3186.06 2615.7 2059.35 3207.67 
 















(857.87) (549.12) (1129.81) (1117.19) (1037.2) (1024.52) 
Rent 
percentage 
106.51 486.85 993 839.47 953.47 1266.29 
(956.73) (580.61) (1270.19) (1388.32) (1102.85) (1306.33) 
Surface 
water 
-179.94 -283.98 -788.63 -1176.3 -1006.45 -460.42 
(855.98) (514.83) (1106.91) (1178.09) (965.1) (875.08) 
HH Income 2.59 0.39 4.75 5.12 2.36 1.37 
 





2182.16 974.57 2551.81 5307.78
***
 1642.65 4006.3 





-1047.69 -317.66 -55.61 -4159.16
*
 851.64 -2383.9 







 -346.65 -274.07 -360.54 -392.36
*
 
(192.44) (124.3) (233.67) (235.4) (220.94) (229.11) 
CRP 49.14 -2.44 -1035.6 -197.15 -226.37 -232 
 
(824.82) (513.16) (964.84) (1001.32) (1002.23) (987.01) 
WLP -742.25 -190.82 44.61 -757.05 -313.56 -454.49 
 
(668.87) (385.01) (869.01) (804.03) (775.26) (842.22) 





 445.21 790.18 724.08 1080.87
*
 939.95 































 375.21 1323.54 2373.2
*
 1621.97 1906.9 

















































(568.51) (344.96) (683.06) (698.16) (687.26) (625.37) 
No till -46.95 64.76 -506.06 302.38 611.49 181.41 
 




739.87 418.54 1053.9 1373.8
*
 976.21 709.18 
(691.64) (408.82) (825.54) (825.95) (827.23) (783.18) 
Nutrient 
manage 
-275.52 9.3 -396.68 -167.82 -135.29 115.84 
(636.64) (408.15) (786.34) (781.51) (788.94) (723.61) 











(714.19) (431.34) (905.43) (909.81) (833.31) (876.46) 
Environ 
Info 
503.06 105.31 478.65 412.75 260.87 33.14 
(724.79) (477.44) (955.09) (878.6) (851.38) (937.62) 
Combined 
Info 
-437.96 -305.87 -519.48 -973.81 -151.72 -1091.03 
(682.44) (428.89) (839.71) (860.9) (744.84) (863.53) 
Constant  -2095.28 15.3 -2940.03 -2559.48 -2889.84 -2288.85 
 















(199.15) (124.74) (340.89) (300.06) (329.99) (343.59) 
N 134 182 182 249 216 253 
    276 255 276 
Largest 
FMI 
- - 0.6987 0.7581 0.65 0.7721 
 






















Offer -97.79 -56.97 -16 -43.71 -30.39 -27.39 
 
(76.81) (51.43) (113.79) (94.7) (105.9) (87.48) 
Land acre 18.81 18.48
*
 21.37 25.25 28.38 19.07 
 












(37.44) (25.51) (73.79) (68.73) (62.9) (56.1) 
Surface water -5.35 -16.35 10.39 25.26 33.82 11.04 
 
(37.15) (25.51) (52.16) (49) (53.11) (37.62) 
HH Income 0.41
**
 0.25 0.35 0.31 0.37 0.33 




















-71.86 -70.91 -62.77 -90.46 -111.54 -18.53 
(65.56) (47.42) (93.81) (86.34) (92.73) (78.51) 
Water quality -8.46 -6.54 -9.71 -9.25 -6.5 -12.44 
 
(8.01) (5.75) (11.46) (9.97) (11.29) (10.14) 




(31) (22.17) (51.04) (48.67) (47.18) (42.78) 
WLP 19.19 18.9 5.34 20.63 0.8 20.31 
 
(29.66) (18.97) (47.91) (40.53) (41.26) (33.94) 
Current usage of other BMPs: 
Riparian 
buffers 
-4.82 9.14 5.46 -12.85 -12.99 1.71 
(24.65) (16.6) (36.73) (31.83) (33.85) (32.28) 
Animal fence 2.67 2.51 7.39 1.09 -10.64 17.79 
 
































(43.22) (27.39) (66.23) (58.2) (63.48) (53.2) 
Nutrient 
manage 
-20.66 -16.84 -8.3 -14.95 10.64 -16.31 






















Choices of other BMPs:  
Riparian 
Buffers 
19.51 10.11 47.8 38.17 66.86 16.69 
(28.25) (17.64) (47.96) (37.88) (44.2) (31.13) 
Animal 
fences 
6.05 16.75 8.09 12.11 27.57 -4.66 




34.81 14.34 38.46 30.88 68.39
*
 28.86 










(27.8) (17.81) (37.77) (39.44) (40.4) (29.42) 
Information about WQT:  
Cost saving 
information 
25.67 28.23 52.48 33.87 26.1 31.51 
(30.05) (20.74) (45.96) (39.22) (44.53) (36.13) 
Environmenta
l aspect Info 
14.09 20.73 70.8 48.88 51.54 25.83 
(35.74) (22.39) (62.6) (51.42) (51.61) (44.97) 
Combined 
Information 
13.9 10.01 14.58 -18.06 -6.36 0.81 
(28.65) (20.98) (41.11) (40.27) (39.32) (35.2) 
Constant  -21.02 -1.54 -152.98 -130.48 -206.82 -76.64 
 















(8.75) (5.93) (26.25) (21.52) (26.11) (20.89) 
N 136 178 178 254 226 254 
    285 264 283 
Largest FMI - - 0.8684 0.8709 0.8501 0.8825 
 




















Offer 0.091 -0.17 -0.633 -0.459 -0.281 -0.127 
 
(1.03) (0.854) (0.84) (0.725) (0.827) (0.751) 
Land acre 0.034 -0.012 0.024 0.016 0.1 0.033 
 
(0.264) (0.2) (0.172) (0.187) (0.156) (0.171) 
Rent 
percentage 
-0.743 -0.389 -0.199 -0.119 -0.404 -0.251 
(0.577) (0.468) (0.446) (0.364) (0.442) (0.377) 
Surface water -0.197 -0.104 0.056 0.181 0.058 0.055 
 
(0.514) (0.426) (0.439) (0.403) (0.429) (0.362) 
HH Income -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
%HH Income 
from farming 
-0.254 -0.388 -0.524 -0.63 -0.682 -0.448 















(0.754) (0.613) (0.602) (0.55) (0.625) (0.556) 
Water quality -0.035 -0.06 -0.072 -0.059 -0.099 -0.092 
 
(0.121) (0.095) (0.092) (0.088) (0.097) (0.084) 
CRP 0.393 0.249 0.175 0.197 0.219 0.271 
 
(0.425) (0.31) (0.314) (0.294) (0.313) (0.294) 
WLP 0.188 0.173 0.197 0.211 0.266 0.071 
 
(0.325) (0.261) (0.26) (0.251) (0.266) (0.241) 
Current usage of other BMPs: 
Riparian 
buffers 
0.344 0.291 0.2 0.032 0.111 0.241 
(0.304) (0.259) (0.265) (0.256) (0.27) (0.233) 
Animal fence -0.062 -0.088 -0.127 -0.196 -0.148 -0.044 
 
(0.332) (0.283) (0.278) (0.247) (0.265) (0.261) 
No till -0.425 -0.239 -0.001 0.026 -0.071 0.016 
 
(0.434) (0.325) (0.327) (0.272) (0.329) (0.297) 
Waste storage 
facility 
0.542 0.295 0.209 0.333 0.345 0.159 
(0.417) (0.343) (0.339) (0.312) (0.338) (0.305) 
Nutrient 
management 
-0.065 -0.158 -0.233 -0.249 -0.178 -0.179 
(0.361) (0.298) (0.287) (0.252) (0.288) (0.264) 




















Choices of other BMPs:  
Riparian 
Buffers 
-0.07 -0.105 -0.12 -0.041 -0.154 -0.063 















(0.38) (0.296) (0.296) (0.328) (0.3) (0.247) 
No till 
-0.22 0.013 0.108 0.135 0.394 0.046 
















(0.361) (0.291) (0.291) (0.357) (0.305) (0.251) 
Information about WQT:  
Cost Info 
0.541 0.316 0.293 0.41 0.359 0.418 
(0.437) (0.365) (0.358) (0.326) (0.356) (0.334) 
Environ Info 
0.34 0.272 0.35 0.351 0.35 0.346 
(0.49) (0.391) (0.397) (0.34) (0.391) (0.358) 
Combo Info 
0.376 0.228 0.182 0.263 0.248 0.332 
(0.476) (0.39) (0.386) (0.362) (0.388) (0.371) 
Constant  -2.364 -1.473 -0.767 -1.157 -1.555 -0.887 
 
(1.443) (1.176) (1.137) (1.045) (1.155) (1.054) 
N 128 151 151 211 200 223 
    243 231 253 
Largest FMI - - 0.1766 0.5681 0.2519 0.4706 
 






Table 3.6 Tobit Regression for Factors Affecting Farmers’ Nutrient Management 
Adoption 









Offer 61.76 54.31 106.64 77.08 141.67 149.16 
 
(143.74) (107.83) (167.03) (152.04) (157.92) (146.53) 
Land acre 29.77 27.63 31.16 30.92 16.75 32.4 
 
(28.44) (22.32) (33.48) (31.65) (33.91) (33.7) 
Rent 
percentage 
25.6 33.87 89.45 115.43 63.95 111.09 
(74.73) (55.06) (93.72) (101.12) (92.54) (97.19) 
Surface water -41.14 -34.5 -38.88 -57.29 -74.49 -3.14 
 
(64.49) (49.06) (70.14) (63.54) (68.87) (58.55) 
HH Income 0.29 -0.05 0.24 0.27 0.55 0.02 
 (0.33) (0.23) (0.41) (0.4) (0.39) (0.38) 
%HH Income 
from farming 
44.41 46.31 21.74 66.86 -2.73 30.66 




49.36 -7.46 27.45 -2.1 -2.85 76.11 
(136.86) (89.67) (148.35) (137.03) (146.52) (132.95) 
Water quality -5.17 -0.22 -2.02 8.92 8.87 -3.63 
 
(16.12) (12.84) (20.09) (17.95) (19.39) (17.58) 
CRP 38.41 50.49 64.71 57.02 8.74 52.53 
 





 -98.82 -74.71 
 
(54.59) (41.16) (74.43) -66.82 (67.13) (62.91) 
















(49.59) (34.77) (55.79) (54.79) (52.56) (50.56) 
Animal fence -10.72 1.12 20.63 19.33 37.66 38.77 
 
(47.49) (35.7) (55.81) (49.98) (50.38) (45.38) 




(57.06) (40.9) (66.18) (56.61) (65.89) (65.77) 
Waste storage 
facility 
-139.59 -91.76 -133.35 -125.8 -128.2 -154.27 
















(48.59) (35.15) (57.02) (51.25) (56.71) (48.36) 























Choices of other BMPs:  
Riparian 
Buffers 
24.7 35.08 44.46 29.59 58.44 33.95 
(53.18) (37.93) (61.12) (55.54) (59.96) (52.97) 
Animal 
fences 
15.97 9.01 13.11 15.7 20.63 16.46 


























(52.41) (38.19) (62.49) (65.53) (64.16) (52.36) 
Information about WQT:  
Cost Info 
4.9 16.9 14.65 2.42 37.08 27.16 
(65.32) (47.48) (74.55) (67.87) (77.55) (74.95) 
Environ Info 
-13.23 -19.75 15.38 -39.63 25.14 -9.91 
(66.26) (48.52) (81.61) (68.75) (78.53) (77.17) 
Combo Info 
60.32 40.49 44.75 40.85 35.28 44.21 
(60.92) (46.88) (68.69) (61.65) (64.98) (65.98) 























(17.12) (12.41) (44.13) (49.68) (47.38) (46.48) 
N 145 176 176 254 239 264 
    288 272 290 
Largest FMI - - 0.8718 0.9376 0.8747 0.9274 
 






















 1698.90 -7.92 -0.44 47.99 
 
(1241.72) (1069.02) (55.88) (0.58) (75.11) 
Land acres -349.53 -1479.42
**
 10.51 0.02 14.08 
 
(453.65) (603.32) (9.78) (0.12) (15.07) 
Rent 
percentage 
305.99 531.11 54.45 -0.13 40.38 
(686.75) (678.7) (36.32) (0.3) (42.21) 
Surface water 251.71 -421.47 5.06 0.04 -17.56 
 
(478.47) (591.9) (25.62) (0.3) (31.55) 
Income  -1.04 2.53 0.17 0.00 0.11 





 -0.36 9.9 






 -27.55 -30.93 0.75
*
 12.38 
(941.17) (1079.71) (46.14) (0.42) (66.66) 
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(477.12) - (21.58) (0.21) (28.47) 
No till 413.33 -269.48 - 0.07 43.17 
 (422.95) (408.99) - (0.2) (28.33) 
Waste storage 
facilities 
-510.95 561.66 18.91 - 65.64
**
 
(494.79) (439.23) (20.56) - (27.77) 
Nutrient 
management 
162.53 -211.23 22.45 0.57
***
 - 
(431.02) (420.1) (18.49) (0.21) - 




 25.83 0.20 6.59 
(459.39) (483.73) (22.65) (0.25) (33.55) 
Environ Info 
254.44 255.54 34.84 0.24 6.89 
(559.28) (509.45) (30.81) (0.28) (36.74) 
Combo Info 
-132.43 -276.73 7.18 0.12 20.19 




80 62 67 - 66 
N 149 182 178 151 176 
Note: Standard errors calculated using Delta method are in parentheses; *, **, and *** 











3.9 Figures in Chapter 3 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Figure 3.1 The Three Cases of Missing Data in the Survey 
  
Yes No Not possible for me  
The follow-up questions are asked:  How much would you like to adopt? 
If the value is 
missing, it is the 
second case of 
missing data. 
If the value is missing, it is the first 
case of missing data 
Respondents 
Yes/No questions are asked:  
Would you like to consider adopting a BMP? If the value is 
missing, it is 






Define  𝑌(1), 𝑌(2), …    and 𝑌(𝑛) are variables with missing data; 
             𝑋 are fully observed variables in the dataset; 
             𝑌(𝑖)𝑖𝑚𝑝(𝑗) is the  i 
th
 variable with observed data and imputed data in  j 
th
 iteration.  
Chain Equation Iteration 1:   
Dependent 
variable 
Predictor variables Imputed 
variable 
𝑌(1)    𝑋                    𝑌(1)𝑖𝑚𝑝(1) 
𝑌(2)   𝑋      𝑌(1)𝑖𝑚𝑝(1) 𝑌
(2)
𝑖𝑚𝑝(1) 






𝑌(𝑛)    𝑋      𝑌(1)𝑖𝑚𝑝(1)         𝑌
(2)





Chain Equation Iteration 2:   
Dependent 
variable 
Predictor variables Imputed 
variable 
𝑌(1)    𝑋      𝑌(2)𝑖𝑚𝑝(1)        𝑌
(3)
𝑖𝑚𝑝(1)   … … 𝑌
(𝑛)
𝑖𝑚𝑝(1)                   𝑌
(1)
𝑖𝑚𝑝(2) 
𝑌(2)   𝑋      𝑌(1)𝑖𝑚𝑝(2)        𝑌
(3)





𝑌(3)    𝑋      𝑌(1)𝑖𝑚𝑝(2)        𝑌
(2)






𝑌(𝑛)    𝑋      𝑌(1)𝑖𝑚𝑝(2)       𝑌
(2)





Chain Equation Iteration j:   
Dependent 
variable 




  𝑋      𝑌(1)𝑖𝑚𝑝(𝑗)      𝑌
(2)
𝑖𝑚𝑝(𝑗)  … 𝑌
(𝑖−1)
𝑖𝑚𝑝(𝑗) 











Figure 3.3 Execution Route of the Second Scenario  
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Chapter 4 The Effect of Land Wealth Change and Local Community Interaction on 
Best Management Practice Adoption 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Best Management Practices (BMPs) are schedules of activities, prohibitions of 
practices, maintenance procedures, and other management practices to prevent or reduce 
the pollution of waters (the U.S. EPA 2015). As increasing concerns about water 
pollutions from agriculture, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) introduces 
Best Management Practices (BMPs) to control agricultural run-off from the surface water, 
and intercept the pesticides and phosphorus diffusing into the underground water. The 
European Union (EU) Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) department also 
progressively encourages farm households to adopt BMPs to respond the increasing 
demand of environmental quality. Both the U.S. and the EU initiate incentive payment 
programs to promote BMPs installed on farmland, such as the Environmental Quality 
Incentive Program (EQIP) in the U.S., and the Agri-Environment Measures (AEM) in the 
EU.  
BMP adoption as a type of farm investment is subject to farm financial conditions, 
especially the available amount of capital resources for investment. As the most valuable 
asset, farmland wealth determines a farm’s financial health, and thus farmland values also 
affect decisions of environmental investment such as BMP adoption. Zhang and 
Nickerson (2015) find that the urban housing market bust during 2007-2008 significantly 
decreases farmland values. The decline of farm wealth drives landowners to leave farm 
business by selling out their lands, and also changes their risk attitudes. The decrease of 
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farmland values therefore discourages environmental investments such as BMP adoption 
on farms in the future.  
In addition to economic factors, previous studies also show that ethic and social 
pressure could motivate farmers to commit to environmental services (Lynne et al. 1988; 
Weaver 1996; Michel-Guillou and Moser 2006; Knowler and Bradshaw 2007; Chouinard 
et al. 2008; Prokopy et al. 2008; Mzoughi 2011; Baumgart-Getz, Prokopy, and Floress 
2012; Sulemana and James Jr. 2014). For one thing, households in the urban fringe area 
or near farms have increasing demand for better water quality, farmland preservation, and 
biodiversity conservation (Leggett and Bockstael 2000; Roe et al. 2004; Ready and 
Abdalla 2005; Chen, Irwin, and Jayaprakash 2009), and strong disutility associated with 
the agricultural pollution from farming practices and livestock production (Palmquist, 
Roka and Vukina 1997; Herriges et al. 2005; Ready and Abdalla 2005). In response to 
water pollution issues, households would migrate out of local regions or appeal to local 
governments to control agricultural run-off (Chen et al. 2009; Irwin et al. 2014). For 
another, farmers’ pro-environmental activities can protect social values, and improve 
their public images (Michel-Guillou and Moser 2006; Chouinard et al. 2008; Mzoughi 
2011; Sulemana and James Jr. 2014). Improving farmers’ social public images is one of 
the most important reasons to motivate farmers to commit to pro-environmental actions 
(Michel-Guillou and Moser 2006). Thus, social interactions with local communities may 
motivate farmers to adopt certain types of BMPs, such as plant buffers alongside a river 
or a waste storage facility preventing agricultural run-off from entering waterways.  
Most previous studies use self-rated awareness variables to capture effects of social 
interactions on BMP adoption. When BMP adopters face a self-rated question, they are 
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more likely to promote themselves that attribute their adoption to social commitments 
and altruism. Consequently, using self-rated variables may lead to overestimated 
adoption. To our knowledge, no study to date has examined the social interaction effects 
using local community characteristic data, and few studies have explicitly examined the 
effect of wealth changes on BMP investment. Our goal is to fill the research gap.   
The objective of our research is to investigate effects of wealth changes and 
interactions with local communities on BMP adoption. To proceed, we closely follow 
Feather and Goodwin (1993) to model BMP adoption in terms of landowners’ investment, 
and to show that the decisions of using BMPs are subject to farm’s wealth. Then, we 
specify the linkage between BMP decisions and social interactions with local 
communities. In the empirical analysis, we combine survey data on BMP adoption 
conducted between 2011 and 2012 in Kentucky with publicly available data from the U.S. 
National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) and the U.S. census bureau. The survey 
is as described in the chapter two. Wealth changes are approximated by percentage 
differences of land value between 2007 and 2012; social interactions with local 
community are understood through three aspects: social pressure, residential effect, and 
local agricultural recreation business effect.  
The article is organized as follows. The second section briefly reviews the previous 
literature. In the third section, we develop a conceptual model to explain BMP adoption 
where farmers are assumed to consider BMP adoption as an environmental investment. 
Then, we specify how local community characteristics influence farmers’ BMP adoption.  
The fourth section introduces our study area, and the fifth section illustrates our empirical 
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models. The last two sections discuss our empirical findings and conclude with the policy 
implication from our findings.    
 
4.2 Literature Review 
 
Given growing attentions of BMPs, numerous studies have attempted to understand the 
mechanism and factors explaining BMP adoption. Three syntheses summarize previous 
empirical studies to explain BMP or conservation practice adoption into four areas: 
farmer and farm household characteristics, farm biophysical characteristics, farm 
financial characteristics, and their attitudes and environmental awareness (Knowler and 
Bradshaw 2007; Prokopy et al. 2008; Baumgart-Getz, Prokopy, and Floress 2012). Due 
to the fact that previous studies have different research regions, data collection processes, 
BMP types considered, and analytic tools used, these syntheses show mixed results, and 
they do not point any factor consistently explaining BMP adoption. 
 
4.2.1 Modelling BMP Investments 
 
Most studies model BMP adoption grounded on the utility maximizing theory. 
Agricultural economists use expected net returns of agricultural and environmental 
production as the building blocks of utility function, BMP adoption can also be 
embedded into the utility function as the decision variable. The expected net return is 
subject to the budget constraint including the investment return, pecuniary costs, farm 
profits, farm wealth, and other economic factors (Feather and Goodwin 1993; Weaver 
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1996; Shively1997; Uris 1997; Fuglie 1999; Soule, Tegene and Wiebe 2000). After 
solving the first-order condition, BMP investments can be represented by a group of 
economic factors. Then, researchers can use a latent variable method to model BMP 
adoption. The latent variable method assumes that an unobserved latent value determines 
individual choices. Previous studies specify the latent value as a linear combination of 
economic factors, and use discrete choice models to estimate BMP adoption (Gould, 
Saupe, and Klemme 1989; Bosch, Cook, and Fuglie 1995; Soule, Tegene, and Wiebe 
2000; Pautsch et al. 2001; Somda, Nianogo, Nassa, and Sanou 2002; Dupraz et al. 2003; 
Amsalu and Graaff 2007). In the next step, researchers can develop the latent variable 
method to model BMP adoption rates by using OLS models, Tobit models, double-hurdle 
models, and switching-regression models (Ervin and Ervin 1982; Norris and Batie 1987; 
Uri 1997; Ma et al. 2012; Abdulai and Huffman 2014).   
The random utility model (RUM) of McFadden (1974) is an alternative method to 
interpret BMP adoption. Farmers would like to adopt BMPs when their utilities of 
adoption are greater than the utilities without adoption. The utility function is 
approximated by financial support, pecuniary costs, and income conditioning on farm 
physical and socioeconomic characteristics. Similar to the latent variable method, 
previous studies employ binary choice models to estimate BMP adoption (Rahm and 
Huffman 1984; Fuglie and Bosch 1995; Cooper and Keim 1996; Fernandez-Cornejo and 
Ferraioli 1999; Lambert, Sullivan, Claassen, Foreman 2007). Researchers also extend 
RUM to fit different research questions, such as polychotomous-choices of different 
farming plans by using a multinomial logit model or a nested logit model (Wu and 
Babcock 1998; Wu, Adams, and Kling 2004; Moreno and Sunding 2005; Lambert, 
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Sullivan, Claassen, Foreman 2007), sequential choices of farming practices by using a 
bivariate probit model (Khanna 2001), interrelated strategies of BMP adoption by using 
system equations (Park and Lohr 2005), choice experiments of willingness to provide 
ecosystem services (Broch et.al 2013), and BMP adoption rates by using a Tobit model or 
a switching-regression model (Adesina and Zinnah 1993; Baidu-Forson 1999). 
Regardless of which theoretical frameworks researchers start from, their empirical 
models converge to a similar conditional mean function, and BMP adoption as the farm 
investment is always specified as being determined by a group of economic factors. 
Following previous literature, in this study, BMP adoption as the farm investments is 
subject to farm financial conditions. As the most valuable asset, land determines a farm’s 
financial health, and thus land wealth also affects BMP adoption. Moreno and Sunding 
(2005) as well as Davey and Furtan (2008) attempt to use assessed values of land and 
buildings to measure the wealth effect on BMP adoption, but cannot find evidences that 
the asset value has any significant impact on the adoption of conservation practices. One 
possible explanation is that landowners’ decisions are more likely to respond to wealth 
changes but not wealth values. Zhang and Nickerson (2015) conclude that the urban 
housing market bust during 2007-2008 significantly decreases farmland values, but 
increased commodity demands over the period stabilize farmland wealth. The financial 
shock during 2007-2008 is an exogenous incident. We hypothesize that the decreasing 





4.2.2 Social Interactions  
 
In addition to economic factors, numerous researchers interpret BMP adoption using 
psychological theory. Pioneered by Ervin and Ervin (1982), researchers try to understand 
BMP adoption by a two-stage framework: the perception stage and the decision stage 
(Norris and Baties 1987; Gould, Saupe, and Klemme 1989; McNamara, Wetzstein, and 
Douce 1991; Traore´, Landry, and Amara 1998; Daberkow and McBride 2003). At the 
perception stage, a farm household perceives that environmental problems such as the 
water pollution and the soil erosion have occurred near its farm, and may potentially 
affect its farm returns, asset values and the household health. At the decision stage, the 
household decides whether or not to adopt conservation plans to address these problems, 
and the decision is motivated by the first stage. To match the two-stage framework, the 
empirical model estimates the perception step firstly, and then estimates the BMP 
decision including an explanatory variable of the predict perception or the residual from 
the first step. Lynne et al. (1988) firstly explain the fundamental linkage between farmers’ 
attitudes and their behaviors, and they conclude that conservation attitudes, social norms, 
and social situations lead to conservation behavioral intentions or actual conservation 
behaviors. Following these pioneer theories, Baumgart-Getz et al. (2012) summarize 46 
studies of BMP adoption over 25 years, and show that both environmental awareness and 
attitude have positive effects on BMP adoption.   
However, few studies have examined whether interactions with their communities 
affect farmers’ contribution to environmental services. Pesticides and phosphorus from 
agricultural activities diffuse into the surface water and lead to eutrophication in water 
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resources; livestock operations also become agricultural disamenity that worsens 
neighborhood living conditions and decreases residential property values (Ready and 
Abdalla 2005). Because farming activities affect public environment and residents’ living 
conditions, controlling agricultural run-off by implementing BMPs becomes an ethical 
decision. Ford and Richardson (1994) review the empirical literature of how ethical 
beliefs affect individual decision, and they find that among other factors, situation 
variables such as referent groups, rewards and sanctions, and types of ethical conflict are 
determinants of ethical decision. Weaver (1996) explains individual contributions to 
agricultural impact on the environment using the theory of prosocial behavior, and he 
concludes that if farmers hold altruistic values, they are more likely to make 
environmental efforts even if they need to sacrifice their profits. Chouinard et al. (2008) 
also find the similar conclusion that some of farmers are willing to sacrifice their profits 
to undertake some levels of conservation practices. 
 In opposite to the ethical or altruistic theory, Michel-Guillou and Moser (2006) 
believe that social pressures lead farmer to commit to environmental protection, and these 
authors’ results show that promoting farmers’ public image is the most important reason 
for farmers’ pro-environmental actions. Mzoughi (2011) finds that social concerns have 
impacts on farmers’ adoption of integrated crop protection and organic farming, and 
these social concerns refer to satisfying landscape demands, being perceived as a leader 
by the other farmers, and showing to others one’s environmental commitment. Sulemana 
and James Jr. (2014) show that farmers’ identities are correlated with attitudes toward 
ethical environmental issues, and they define the identity as who they are, how they view 
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themselves, how they view the world around them, and how they think as well as want 
others to perceive them.  
Our study aims to expand previous research on how social interactions affect farmers’ 
adoption of BMPs. Most previous studies use self-rated awareness variables to represent 
social interaction effects. Farmers are more likely to overstate their motivations for BMP 
adoption, and thus social interaction effects can be overestimated. Instead of using self-
rated variables, our study uses local community demographic information, and 
community characteristics obtained from exogenous sources to capture social effects on 
BMP adoption.   
 
4.3 The Conceptual Model  
 
We closely follow Feather and Goodwin (1993)’s work, and assume that farmers 
consider BMP adoption as an environmental investment. In the long-term, the expected 
net present value (PV) of the BMP investment is:  
𝑁𝑃𝑉 =  ∫ 𝑒−𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0
                                                                       (4.1) 
where 𝑇 is the time, 𝑟 is the discount rate, 𝑅𝑡 are all of the expected net revenue from the 
BMP investment, and 𝐶𝑡 are the expected costs associated with BMP adoption. Without 
the capital constraint, a positive 𝑁𝑃𝑉 will lead to the BMP investment.  
If farmers are facing several investment choices, they will need to compare 
investments of BMP adoption with other available alternative investments. Our 
conceptual model assumes that in the long-term farmers are rationing their investments 
with perfect foresight; BMPs that can be capitalized are durable capital. Farmers will 
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maximize their total net present values of bundle of investments, subject to capital 
constraint, such as:  






𝑦𝑗                                                                         (4.2) 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜: ∑ 𝐼𝑗𝑦𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
≤ 𝐶                                                                                           
where 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑗 denotes the net present value for the investment 𝑗 with associated continuous 
time amortization factor in the bracket; 𝑦𝑗 is the a binary decision of BMP investment (if 
adopt a BMP, then 𝑦𝑗 = 1). 𝐼𝑗  is the amount of investment for project 𝑗, and 𝐶  is the 
available amount of capital resources for investment. Farmers will compare the net 
present value of BMP investments with alternative investments, and maximize the total 
net present value in the long-term.  
In addition, previous studies show that farm and farmer’s characteristics, government 
requirements and incentive programs can also affect the choice of BMP investment (𝑦𝑗), 
and thus change net present values of BMP investment (𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑗). As a result, we include 
the biophysical constraint, the government regulation constraint, the technology 
constraint, and other constraints to restrict BMP investment. The fully specified 
conceptual model can be described as:  






𝑦𝑗                                                                         (4.3) 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜: ∑ 𝐼𝑗𝑦𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1






≤ 𝑏𝑖 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖                                                                                              
where the group of constraints refers to all factors affecting BMP investment and other 
investments. The subscript 𝑖 indicates the 𝑖th constraint, the Α𝑖𝑗 is the coefficients for the 
𝑖th constraint under the 𝑗th investment, and the 𝑏𝑖 refers to the available resource for 𝑖th 
constraint. To satisfy the order condition,  𝑖 ≥ 𝑗 − 1.  
From the first order condition, solutions of our model are denoted as: 𝑦∗, a vector of 
optimal decisions of investment. The optimal decision of BMP investment 𝑦𝑗
∗  is 
determined by an unobserved function 𝑣𝑗 . The 𝑣𝑗  consists of net present value of 
investments (𝑁𝑃𝑉), available amount of capital resources for investment (𝐶), technical 
coefficients affecting BMP adoption (Α𝑖 ), resource limit (𝑏𝑖 ), and investments of all 
projects except the amount of BMP investment (𝐼−𝑗 ) conditioning on socioeconomic 
characteristics (θ). Formally, the optimal decision of BMP investment  𝑦𝑗
∗ is described as 
follows:  
𝑦𝑗
∗ = 1   𝑖𝑓  𝑣𝑗(𝑁𝑃𝑉, 𝐶, Α𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖 , 𝐼−𝑗|θ) > 0                                                  (4.4) 
𝑦𝑗
∗ =  0 𝑖𝑓   𝑣𝑗 ≤ 0                                                                                                     
where the subscript (−𝑗) denotes any investment other than project 𝑗.  
    In particular, the available capital resources (𝐶) include available cash for investment 
and borrowing capacity. The available cash for investment is determined by income, 
costs and savings, while farmer borrowing capacity is evaluated by farm asset value. The 
available cash for investment can be measured by income level, income sources, and 
share of income contributed back to farming. Farmer borrowing capacity cannot be 
observed directly, but can be approximated by land wealth partially because farmland 
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wealth is the most valuable asset on the farm. Increasing farm wealth can possibly 
improve landowners’ borrowing capacity, and increase the possibility to invest on 
environmental improvement; oppositely, the decline of farm wealth may affect farmer 
borrowing capacity, change risk attitudes of landowners, and discourage their 
environmental investments in the future. In respond to decreasing land values, some 
landowners even leave farm business by selling out their lands. Therefore farmers are less 
likely to implement BMPs on their lands if land wealth is decreasing.  
    To simplify mathematical terms, let 𝑣∗ be an unobserved value determining observed 
decisions of adopting BMPs (𝑦𝑗
∗). 𝑣∗ can be linear determined by a vector of economic 
variables (𝑋) and an unobserved random term (𝑢). To be specific, the latent value (𝑣∗) is 
modelled as follows:    
𝑣∗ = 𝑋′𝛽 + 𝑢           𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒     𝑢~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢
2)                                                (4.5 ) 
𝑦 = 1 (𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)                     𝑖𝑓   𝑣∗ > 0                                                             
𝑦 = 0 (𝑛𝑜 𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)               𝑖𝑓  𝑣∗ ≤ 0                                                              
where 𝛽 is the coefficient vector associate with variables 𝑋. 𝑋 includes net benefit of 
BMP adoption, available capital, other investments, biophysical resource limit, and 
socioeconomic characteristics. Then, we can derive the probability of adopting a BMP 
(𝑦 = 1) conditioning on socioeconomic variables (θ):  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑦 = 1|θ] =  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑣∗ > 0|θ] = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑥′𝛽 +  > 0|θ]                         
= 1 − 𝐹(−𝑥′𝛽|θ) = 𝐹(𝑥′𝛽|θ)                                                                     (4.6) 
where 𝐹(. ) is a cumulative distribution function. As we discussed in the literature review, 
we hypothesize that in addition to economic factors, social interactions with local 
communities (𝑠) may affect adoption decisions. To simplify the empirical estimation, we 
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suppose that economic factors and social interactions are linear combination of the 
reduced form of our model. Finally, the equation 4.7 can be rewritten as follows:  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑦 = 1|θ, s] = F(𝑥′𝛽|θ, s)                                                                    (4.7) 
We assume that 𝐹(. ) follows the normal distribution function Φ(. ), and a Probit model 
can be used to estimate the probability of using a BMP.   
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑦 = 1|θ, s] = Φ(𝑥′𝛽|θ, s)                                                                   (4.8) 
 
4.4 Study Area 
 
The study area is in the Kentucky River watershed covering 7,000 square miles across 
42 counties with 16,000 miles of streams. The 700,000 residents in this area use about 
100 million gallons of water per day from streams and reservoirs in the watershed. More 
than 2,075 square miles of the watershed have been designated as priority watersheds 
(sub-watershed), impacted by pathogens, nutrients, habitat, alterations, siltation, low 
dissolved oxygen, and metals (Carey 2009). We use the same survey as described in the 
previous chapter. Data were from a mail survey of farmers in the watershed across 35 
counties from 2011 to 2012 with 23% response rate. We selected 357 valid observations 
that contained at least some completed responses regarding to BMP-related questions and 
were used in the final analysis. Our survey questions included farmer participation in 
current government-funded environmental programs, their potential adoption of 
additional BMPs through a proposed Water Quality Trading (WQT) program, 
socioeconomic characteristics and their zip codes. The survey asked farmers questions 
about current BMPs implemented and the extent to which farmers would adopt more 
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BMPs if compensated through WQT. Table 2.3 presents all variables and summary 
statistics for the entire sample. Table 2.4 explains discrete levels in explanatory variables.  
We also collected land value and local community data in our study area from the 
publicly available data. The land wealth data are obtained from the U.S. census of 
agriculture in the county levels. By using the zip code information, we can attach publicly 
available data to our survey data. The 2013 Urban Influence Codes (UICs) obtained from 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service (USDA ERS). The UICs 
distinguish all counties, county equivalents, independent cities in the U.S. into 2 
categories (metro and non-metro counties) with 12 groups. The metropolitan counties are 
further divided into two groups by the population size. The nonmetropolitan counties are 
categorized into 10 levels by the degree of urbanization and adjacency to metro areas. 
The USDA ERS releases UICs data every ten years. The 2013 UICs data is the closest 
date to match our 2012 survey data. Housing density, population density and residential 
housing values are collected from the U.S. census bureau. 
 
4.5 Empirical Model 
 
As shown in our conceptual model, we estimate decisions of BMP adoption by using 
Probit models. Farmers who answered “not possible for me” are excluded in the analysis 
of BMP adoption. In the model of each BMP, the dependent variable is a binary choice of 
whether farmers would like to accept our offer to adopt the corresponding BMP (1 if yes, 
0 if no). In addition, we also use a dependent variable indicating whether farmers would 
accept our offer to adopt any of the five BMPs (1 if yes, 0 if no) to investigate whether 
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there are common factors explaining BMP adoption in our study area. The independent 
variables include compensations for BMP adoption, wealth effects, local community 
characteristics, farming plans, socioeconomic characteristics, and information treatments. 
Except variables of farming plans, all models use the same set of independent variables to 
explain the adoption of five BMPs.  
 
4.5.1 Variable Specification   
 
In our models, we measure wealth changes by using percentage differences of land 
values between 2007 and 2012. Due to limited access to the census data, we can only 
collect land value data at the county level from the U.S. census of agriculture. Percentage 
differences of estimated market values of land and buildings per acre between 2007 and 




∗ 100%                                                                   (4.9 ) 
where 𝐿2007 and  𝐿2012 denote market values of land and buildings per acre in 2007 and 
2012 respectively, and 𝛿 =0.9 is the deflation index. We assume that if farmers have 
experienced land value decrease in the last five years, the decline of their land values 
would discourage their willingness to adopt BMPs in the future. Table 4.1 summarizes 
changes of land values in our study area and all of counties in Kentucky from 1997 to 
2012. During 2007 -2012, there are 69% of counties in our study areas with decreased 
land values, and 61% of counties in the state with decreased land values. In addition, the 
table also shows that the average differences of farmland values in our study area have 
significantly decreased between 2007 and 2012, while average land values consistently 
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increased between 1997 and 2002, and between 2002 and 2007. It indicates that the 
financial crisis has a significant shock on farmland values in our study area.  
As we introduced in the literature, this study understands effects of social interactions 
from three aspects: social pressure, residential demands, and local agricultural and 
recreational business effect. The social pressure effect cannot be observed using 
secondary data. Even if our survey asks attitude questions about social pressure, the 
impact will likely be underestimated since most respondents may not acknowledge that 
their environmental behaviors are a result from social pressure. As a result, we 
approximate this effect by using an urban indicator and a rural index calculated from the 
2013 UICs obtained from the USDA ERS. In our studies, if respondents are in 
metropolitan counties, metro dummies are equal to one, but rural indexes are equal to 
zero; if respondents are in the nonmetropolitan counties, metro dummies are equal to zero, 
and rural indexes are equal to corresponding UIC values of nonmetropolitan counties. 
Our hypothesis is that if farms are in rural counties, when they pollute water resources, 
they are less likely to be detected. Hence, without public supervision, farmers have the 
incentive not to adopt BMPs; in other words, living in rural counties may not have any 
effect on farmers’ BMP adoption. In our study, we would like to consider these indexes 
to have controlled the effects of public supervision in our model rather than to capture 
social pressure effect precisely.   
Expected results of urban effects are mixed. On the one hand, if farms are in metro 
counties, they are more likely to be exposed to the public if they produce water pollution. 
Thus, farmers in metro counties are more likely to adopt BMPs to control agricultural 
run-off because of social pressures. On the other hand, if farms are in metro counties, 
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farmlands are more likely to be converted to non-agricultural usage lands- developed 
lands-in the future if they are not participating in conservation easement programs. At the 
same time, building up riparian buffers, animal fences and waste storage facilities are 
more likely to increase conversion costs from agricultural lands to developed lands. 
Agricultural land values are determined by agricultural production, nearby developed 
land values, and the conversion cost (Capozza 1989). Consequentially, adopting BMPs 
will increase the conversion cost, and may potentially decrease land values when 
landowners sell their lands. Therefore, farms in metro counties are also less likely to 
adopt BMPs if they are planning to sell their lands. Our research cannot separate positive 
and negative effects of metro areas on BMP adoption, but our result can provide the net 
effect.  
We approximate residential effects by using housing densities and residential housing 
values. The housing density is the total numbers of residential housing units in the 2010 
divided by the corresponding county area. The residential housing value is the 5 years 
average median housing value of owner-occupied housing units from 2008 to 2012. 
Similar to the metro effect discussed above, we hypothesize that surrounding residential 
development may increase attention to farmers’ environmental awareness and exert social 
pressures, and thus have a positive effect to BMP adoption. 
Local agricultural recreation effect can be measured by the income from agricultural 
tourism and recreational services from the U.S. census of agriculture. Unfortunately, data 
of agricultural recreational services are unavailable and a large portion of data is missing. 
In order to control for water quality demand from agricultural recreational business, our 
study selects the equine business to capture this effect. Based on the Kentucky equine 
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survey (2012), the value added effect of total equine industry impacts, which is defined as 
new income paid to workers, profits earned by businesses or dividends paid to 
shareholders, is estimated to be 1.4 billion dollars in Kentucky. As one of major 
agricultural recreation industries in Kentucky, farms with equine business and horse 
riders also demand better environmental quality and amenity. Most of respondents live in 
counties with large amount of equine inventory. For example the Fayette county, the 
Bourbon county, and the Woodford county are top three equine inventory counties in 
Kentucky. Increasing equine recreational business in their communities or on their farms 
will motivate farm households to commit to pro-environmental actions. In our survey, 
although several respondents state that they have horses or ponies on their farms, whether 
or not having horses or ponies may not be appropriate to measure this effect. First, we 
cannot determine whether the horses or ponies on their farms are raised for recreational 
business such as riding or for farm owners’ personal uses. Second, the presence of horses 
or ponies cannot capture the effect of the entire equine business in the community. Third, 
only a small portion of respondents mention they have horses or ponies on their farm, 
thus our data are limited. An alternative solution is to use inventory of horses and ponies 
owned by farms from the U.S. census of agriculture as a proxy variable to measure this 
effect. The equine inventory includes horses bred for sales or racing, and horses and 
ponies for recreation. As a result, the number of horses and ponies are positively 
correlated with equine recreational activities. As a result, we use the inventory of horses 




    Farming planning is found to determine BMP adoption in previous literature. In 
addition to obtain economic benefit, farmers also consider whether BMPs can be 
incorporated into their current and future BMP plans. In our research, current BMP plans 
refer to farmers current BMP adoption, and future BMP plans denote synergy of BMPs in 
the future. Current BMP adoption is captured by a series of dummy variables of whether 
farmers are currently using any of five BMPs. The synergy effect implies some BMPs 
may be always adopted together, and these effects are also examined by a group of 
dummy variables of farmers’ choices of other BMPs.   
Socioeconomic characteristics are obtained from our survey, and include age, gender, 
education level, water recreation activities and farming experiences. Farm characteristics 
consist of farm sizes, whether farms have crop or livestock production, rent percentage, 
whether farms have surface water on the farmland, participation in Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP) and Working-Land Program (WLP). In the end, as we introduced before, 
we use three dummy variables to measure the effect of information treatment of WQT 
knowledge on BMP adoption.  
 
4.5.2 Spatial Consideration  
 
Most of previous studies commonly assume that BMP investments are spatial 
independence or ignore spatial heterogeneity. Spatial dependence in choice outcomes 
indicates observed choices at one location are affected by choices made at nearby 
locations. Models without considering the spatial dependence will results in bias, and 
potentially amplify the omitted variable bias (LeSage and Pace 2009). Spatial 
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heterogeneity arises from spatial error correlation in the model, and will result in 
inefficiency of estimation (Irwin 2002; Irwin and Bockstael 2004). In our study, 
dependent variables are stated preferences of BMP adoption. We assume that respondents’ 
stated choices could not be influenced by other observations during the time of the survey, 
but their decisions are affected by other farmers’ current BMP adoption or other 
unobserved spatial factors. Thus, the spatial correlation arises from the unobserved error 
term instead of dependent variables.  
    Deriving from equations 4.5 and 4.8, the probit model with spatial errors is specified as 
follows:  
𝑣∗ = 𝑋′𝛽 + 𝑢                                                                                                 (4.10) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒       𝑢 = 𝜌𝑊𝑢 +    𝑎𝑛𝑑    ~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀
2𝐼𝑛)                                                  
𝑦 = 1 (𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)               𝑖𝑓   𝑣∗ > 0                                                                  
𝑦 = 0 (𝑛𝑜 𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)         𝑖𝑓  𝑣∗ ≤ 0                                                                   
where 𝑣∗is a 𝑛 × 1 vectors of observations on the unobserved latent variable determining 
the observed choice of BMP adoption ( 𝑦 ); 𝑋  is a 𝑚 × 𝑛  vector of 𝑚  observed 
explanatory variables, and 𝛽  is a 𝑚 × 1  vector of parameter associated with 𝑋 . 
Following the general framework of spatial error term model, equation 4.10 specifies the 
spatial correlated error term 𝑢 . 𝑊  is a 𝑛 × 𝑛  spatial weights matrix indicating spatial 
structure of our observations, 𝜌  is a scalar parameter, and  is assumed to be i.i.d.  
Furthermore, the reduced form of equation 4.10 can be rewritten as:  
𝑣∗ = 𝑋′𝛽 + (𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊)  
−1                                                                        (4.11) 
    One technical challenge in our research is to generate the spatial weight matrix. We 
intend to use the zip code information to identify respondents’ spatial correlation. 
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However, several observations share the same zip code information in our data, so not all 
of respondents have unique geographic information, and thus the weight matrix cannot be 
generated properly. One strategy is to aggregate respondents’ binary choices in the same 
zip code into a new variable−the percentage of choices. For example, n% of respondents 
in the zip code XXXXX would like to adopt riparian buffers. This strategy may highly 
distort the distribution of data and omit large portions of information. First, some certain 
areas, such as rural areas, only contain one respondent, so the percentage variable would 
have extreme values such as 100% or 0%. The extreme value may result in a highly 
skewed distribution of dependent variable-percentage of choices. Second, numbers of 
observations are compressed from 356 to 71, and individual’s preferences cannot be 
represented properly. Moreover, effects of socioeconomic characteristics cannot be 
measured either.  
An alternative strategy is to treat respondents in the same zip code as their own 
neighbors.  Thus, we can use full information in our data without any gross aggregation. 
But some zip codes only have one respondent which means they do not have neighbors, 
so these observations become “islands”. In addition, this strategy only captures the spatial 
correlation within the same zip code.  One solution is to apply two separate weigh 
matrices in a regression framework: one for the same zip code and define it as a first 
order continuity matrix, and another for the adjacency zip code and define it as a second 
order matrix. Incorporating spatial dependence in two spatial weight matrices will capture 
both neighborhood effect within the same zip codes and neighborhood effect between 
different zip codes. Bell and Bockstael (2000) propose the GMM approach to address the 
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issue of higher order contiguity matrices, and specify a new spatial error structure as 
follows:  
𝑢 = 𝜌1𝑊1𝑢 + 𝜌2𝑊2𝑢 +                                                                             (4.12) 
Following their framework, we can estimate the spatial error model with a second order 
contiguity matrix by using Kelejian and Prucha’s GMM approach (1998, 1999). However, 
Kelejian and Prucha’s method require |𝐼 − 𝜌1𝑊1 − 𝜌2𝑊2| to be inverted in each iteration. 
As we discussed in previous sections, several observations are “islands” so that |𝐼 −
𝜌1𝑊1 − 𝜌2𝑊2|  cannot be inverted. Following Pinkse and Slade (1998), Klier and 
McMillen (2008) linearize their GMM approach so that the computing process does not 
need to invert |𝐼 − 𝜌1𝑊1 − 𝜌2𝑊2|. Unfortunately, their linearized GMM approach cannot 
identify spatial error structure. Therefore, the weight matrix is still unsolved in our case. 
If our model does follow the spatial error structure, the disadvantage of not controlling 
spatial error term is inefficiency. In contrast, if we use an inappropriate weight matrix, 
the spatial correlation would be highly distorted, and results are even not reliable. At this 
stage, unless we find a more appropriate weight matrix, this study decides to not control 
the spatial error term issue in our research, and results using probit models will suffer 
inefficiency issues.  
 
4.6 Empirical Results  
 
Table 4.2 reports results of Probit models estimating decisions of five BMPs. In the 
table, the first column is the model investigating common factors explaining BMP 
adoption. Results in this model show that current experiences of BMPs, shares of farm 
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investment, gender, education level, and water quality near their farms can influence their 
adoption decisions.  
In particular, if respondents are currently using any BMP on their lands, they tend to 
adopt additional BMPs through the WQT compensation to abate more agricultural runoff. 
Respondents with large shares of farm investment are more likely to invest on BMP 
adoption in the future. Male respondents are more likely to implement BMPs, and 
farmers with higher education level prefer to use BMPs. Poor water quality near farms 
would motivate farmers to adopt BMPs. However, there is no statistical evidence found 
that wealth changes and local community characteristics would affect BMP adoption.  
In models of specific BMPs, wealth changes and social interactions have significant 
impacts on adopting different types of BMPs. At first, the decline of land value between 
2007 and 2012 discourage farmers to adopt riparian buffers, but would not affect the 
adoption of other BMPs. One possible explanation is that building up riparian buffers 
may need to take large areas on farmlands, and decrease agricultural profits. Increased 
commodity demands over the period stabilize farmland wealth during the economic 
recession during 2008 to 2012 (Capozza 1989; Zhang and Nickerson 2015). In order to 
stabilize farmland wealth, farmers are less likely to build up riparian buffers because it 
will sacrifice their farm profits.  
Our results also find that social interactions with local communities have significant 
impacts on BMP adoption. If farms are in metro areas, farmers are less likely to adopt 
riparian buffers. As we discussed in variable specification, landowners in the metro 
counties are more likely to sell their lands. Farms with riparian buffers have higher 
conversion costs from agricultural lands to developed lands. Meanwhile, higher 
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conversion costs will decrease farmland values in the land market (Capozza 1989). 
Therefore, landowners are less likely to build up riparian buffers on their lands in metro 
counties because they may exit their farm business at any time. When farms are located 
in rural counties, farmers are less likely to fence off livestock from water resources. This 
result is consistent with our hypotheses. If farms are located at rural counties, they are 
less likely to interact directly with the public, and thus social pressure for them to be 
more environmentally conscious may be less. Farms located at communities with large 
amount of equine inventory are more likely to adopt animal fences and nutrient 
management. Residential housing values have negative effects on implementing animal 
fences.  
    Our results show that increasing the compensation is more likely to incentivize farmers 
to adopt riparian buffers, animal fences, and waste storage facilities. The explanation of 
WQT programs focusing on cost saving information is more likely to encourage farmers 
to adopt animal fences and nutrient management. Explanations of WQT programs 
including both cost saving and environmental benefit information are more likely to 
persuade farmers to consider riparian buffers.  
    Our results also show some evidences of synergy of BMP adoption. If farmers would 
like to use riparian buffers, they are more likely to adopt animal fences or nutrient 
management together. If farmers would like to build up animal fences on their land, they 
tend to implement riparian buffers, build up waste storage facilities, and adopt no till on 
their farms. If farmers would adopt more no till on their land, they are more likely to use 
waste storage facilities and nutrient management at the same time. If farmers would like 
to build up waste storage facilities, they are more likely to build up riparian buffers and 
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animal fences, and use nutrient management through the WQT program as well. If 
farmers tend to use nutrient management in the future, they are more likely to implement 
no till, and build up animal fences and waste storage facilities at the same time.  
    In addition, if farmers are currently using BMPs, they are more likely to expand the 
scope of BMPs through our proposed incentive payment program in the future. If farmers 
are currently using a BMP on their farm, they are more likely to adopt more of the same 
BMP in the future, except for waste storage facilities. If farmers are currently having 
riparian buffers on their farms, they are more likely to adopt waste storage facilities. 
However, not all of current experiences of BMPs have positive effects on the adoption of 
other BMPs. If farmers are currently having waste storage facilities on their farms, they 
are less likely to implement riparian buffers and nutrient management. If farmers are 
currently using nutrient management, they are less likely to adopt no till and build up 
waste storage facilities.  
   For demographic and socioeconomic variables, factors affecting BMP adoption include 
farming experience, land area, rent area, surface water on farmland, percentage of 
household income from farming, total household income reinvested back to farm, age, 
gender, education level, income level, water recreation activities, current participation in 
conservation reserve programs and working land programs, water quality, and minority. 
Farmers with more farming experiences prefer to adopt additional no till, but may be less 
likely to use riparian buffers. Large-size farms are less likely to build up animal fences. 
Farmers who rent more farmland are less likely to adopt no till. Farms with surface water 
resources are more likely to build up riparian buffers and waste storage facilities to 
intercept agricultural run-off diffusing into water resources, but are less likely to build up 
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animal fences and use nutrient management on their farms. The percentage of income 
coming from the farm has positive significant impact on the adoption of animal fences. If 
farmers invest large shares of their income on their farms, they tend to build up more 
riparian buffers and waste storage facilities. Older farmers are more likely to adopt 
riparian buffers, but are less likely to build up animal fences and use no till and nutrient 
management. Male famers are more likely to use animal fences but are less likely to build 
up waste storage facilities. Farmers with higher education are in favor of having 
additional animal fences and nutrient management. Farmers with water related recreation 
activities at least once a year prefer to adopt riparian buffers. Farm household income has 
negative effect on the adoption of waste storage facilities. Poor water quality near farms 
would lead farmers to use more riparian buffers, animal fences, no till, waste storage 
facilities and nutrient management in the future. If farmers are currently participating in 
conservation reserve programs, they are less likely to adopt no till. If farmers are 
currently participating in working land programs, they would not like to adopt nutrient 
management in the future. Minority farmers are more likely to use waste storage facilities 
on their land.  
 
4.7 Conclusion  
     
    Our study attempts to take into account effects of wealth changes and local community 
interactions in explaining BMP adoption. We combine our survey data on BMP adoption 
conducted between 2011 and 2012 in Kentucky with the public data through the 
geographic information.  Wealth changes are measured by percentage differences of the 
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estimated market value of land and buildings between 2007 and 2012; local community 
interactions are approximated by three aspects: rural effect, urban effect, residential effect, 
and local farm recreation business effect.  
    Our results show that decreasing farmland values during the financial crisis discourage 
the future adoption of riparian buffers. If farms are in metro counties, farm owners are 
less likely to adopt riparian buffers; when farms are in rural counties, they are less likely 
to fence off animal from water resources. If farms are located at counties with large 
amount of equine inventory, they are more likely to build up animal fences and use 
nutrient management. Residential housing values have negative effects on the adoption of 
animal fences. In addition, our result also find that increasing the cost coverage 
compensation can incentivize farmers to further implement riparian buffers, animal 
fences, and waste storage facilities. One of the interesting findings is that farmers who are 
currently using BMPs are more likely to expand the scope of their current adoption to 
abate more agricultural run-off. Our results can help policy maker design a more cost-
effective payment scheme, and target willing sellers in the water quality trading market.   
The policy implication of our research has two folds. First, if interactions with local 
communities motivate farmers’ commitment to BMP adoption, policy makers could 
identify potential BMP adopters and promote the adoption in certain communities 
effectively. Second, if the decline of land wealth discourages farmers to invest on BMP in 
the future, the traditional cost-sharing payment scheme may not trigger BMP adoption 




4.8 Tables in Chapter 4 
Table 4.1 Comparison of Farmland Value in Kentucky and in our Study area 
 





Number of counties with land value decreasing during 2007-
2012 69% 61% 
Number of counties with land value decreasing during 2002-
2007 22% 12% 
Number of counties with land value decreasing during 1997-
2002 31% 28% 
Average estimated market values of land and buildings per acre 
2012 
$ 2880.0
6 $ 2599.95 
Average estimated market values of land and buildings per acre 
2007 $ 2947 $ 2589.62 
Average estimated market values of land and buildings per acre 
2002 
$ 2422.8
3 $ 2080.42 
Average estimated market values of land and buildings per acre 
1997 
$ 2154.2
6 $ 1867.38 
Average differences of land value between 2007 and 2012 $ -66.94 $ 10.33 
Average differences of land value between 2002 and 2007 $ 524.17 $ 509.20 
Average differences of land value between 1997 and 2002 $ 268.57 $ 213.03 
 
Note: The dollar value in 2007 is the base value. The inflation calculation is calculated by 


























 -0.004 0.738 -2.774 -1.243 
(0.785) (11.397) (2.317) (2.05) (1.843) (2.194) 
Housing density 
in 2012  
0 0.001 0 -0.002 0 0 
(0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Metro area (=1) 0.096 -5.669
***
 -1.144 -0.271 -0.373 -0.269 
(0.317) (2.038) (0.794) (0.855) (0.81) (0.941) 
Rural level -0.022 -0.106 -0.502
***
 -0.011 0.049 0.128 






 -0.057 0.048 0.517
*
 
(0.085) (0.57) (0.215) (0.212) (0.234) (0.269) 
5 years median 
housing value of 
owner-occupied 




 0.004 0.004 0.012 
(0.005) (0.027) (0.012) (0.01) (0.01) (0.017) 
Information provided in the survey: hypothetical cost coverage compensation and 








 (0.51) (2.766) (1.531) (1.337) (1.361) (1.665) 




 -0.039 -0.113 1.552
**
 
 (0.215) (1.03) (0.657) (0.487) (0.462) (0.718) 
Environmental 
info 
-0.033 0.563 -0.446 0.398 0.707 -0.613 
 (0.228) (0.924) (0.68) (0.546) (0.516) (0.852) 
Joint info -0.058 1.993
*
 -0.626 -0.579 0.006 1.1 
























 -0.31 -0.324 2.044
***
 
- - (0.73) (0.518) (0.432) (0.758) 







 - (1.362) - (0.485) (0.413) (0.525) 





 - (0.904) (0.5) - (0.418) (0.569) 




















- (0.953) (0.542) (0.462) (0.474) - 
Current usage of BMPs 




 - - - - - 
 (0.187) - - - - - 







 - (0.788) (0.491) (0.408) (0.424) (0.482) 
Current Fencing - -0.815 2.718
***
 0.369 -0.339 0.063 
 - (0.833) (0.617) (0.442) (0.387) (0.532) 
Current No till - 0.847 -0.724 2.83
***
 -0.122 0.825 
 - (1.018) (0.707) (0.633) (0.459) (0.602) 
Current Waste - -7.584
***
 1.067 -0.399 0.353 -2.029
**
 
 - (2.441) (1.348) (0.769) (0.6) (0.925) 







 - (0.84) (0.548) (0.562) (0.495) (0.566) 





 -0.021 0.036 
 (0.008) (0.046) (0.021) (0.019) (0.017) (0.023) 
Land area 0.038 -0.449 -1.635
*
 0.514 0.056 -0.21 
 (0.163) (0.401) (0.945) (0.613) (0.218) (0.253) 
Rent percentage -0.122 0.576 -0.541 -1.373
*
 -0.402 0.373 
 (0.29) (1.431) (0.792) (0.765) (0.642) (0.815) 









 (0.223) (1.104) (0.715) (0.704) (0.54) (0.922) 




























 0.033 -0.113 -0.07 









 -0.059 -0.016 0.451
***
 -0.074 
(0.063) (0.437) (0.225) (0.161) (0.147) (0.209) 





 (0.159) (0.785) (0.464) (0.402) (0.346) (0.454) 
Farms with 
livestock 
0.038 -1.114 -0.104 -1.502
**
 -0.114 0.667 
(0.205) (0.833) (0.71) (0.592) (0.514) (0.856) 






















 0.021 -0.05 0.442
***
 
 (0.044) (0.177) (0.137) (0.108) (0.093) (0.169) 
Income level 0.083 -0.01 0.104 0.153 -0.227
*
 -0.141 





 0.556 0.414 -0.578 0.746 
(0.16) (1.321) (0.437) (0.384) (0.388) (0.484) 
CRP - -1.616 -1.272 -2.007
***
 0.612 1.059 
 - (1.076) (0.843) (0.609) (0.445) (0.839) 
WLP 0.182 -0.445 -0.309 -0.177 0.682 -1.109
*
 














 (0.058) (0.231) (0.219) (0.143) (0.133) (0.187) 
Beginning 
farmer 
0.064 0.522 -0.987 -0.119 0.553 1.057 
(0.302) (1.061) (0.972) (0.674) (0.685) (0.92) 
Minority farmer 0.204 -1.487 2.493 1.838 2.497
**
 0.505 
 (0.378) (1.481) (2.218) (1.484) (1.23) (1.581) 
Constant  -0.332 -7.671 4.971
*
 3.414 -2.902 -7.228 
 (1.077) (6.138) (2.857) (2.816) (2.55) (3.623) 
N 356 149 182 177 150 175 
Pseudo R2 0.173 0.717 0.671 0.58 0.477 0.68 






 imply 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 2. Standard errors are below coefficients. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
 
My dissertation reflects part of my research interests regarding economic analysis of 
environmental services, and decisions of environmental investments. In particular, my 
dissertation investigates farmers’ current usage of BMPs and their willingness to use 
additional BMPs through a proposed WQT program in Kentucky. Our results show that 
not only do economic benefits encourage farmers to adopt BMPs, farmers’ current 
experiences of BMPs, information about payment programs, farming plans, wealth 
changes, and their social interactions can determine BMP adoption and adoption rates. 
Hence, BMP adoption is determined by a comprehensive decision making process 
including economic analysis, biophysical conditions, farming and investment plans in the 
long run, and social interests. On the one hand, market mechanisms are likely to motivate 
farmers to implement BMPs and supply trading credits to meet water quality goals; on 
the other hand, policy makers may need to advertise social values of protecting the 
environment, and provide more education, training, and other assistance to help farmers 
become an adopter of BMPs. These efforts will improve the effectiveness and efficiency 
of WQT programs. 
    The dissertation is organized around three objectives. The first objective is to 
investigate farmers’ current usage of BMPs in Kentucky, and the factors affecting 
farmers’ choices of BMPs through WQT programs. These steps will improve the market 
prediction, and help local agency identify farmers’ willingness to participate in WQT 
programs. Chapter two is initiated by our first objective to investigate farmers’ 
willingness to participate in BMPs through a proposed WQT program in Kentucky. A 
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CVM is used in this section through a survey of farmers in the Kentucky River watershed. 
The WQT program did not exist in Kentucky when the data were collected, and still does 
not exist to date. Since the WQT program is designed to offer farmers compensation for 
implementing BMPs, the CVM question is whether the respondent will accept the offer 
of some compensation for using the BMPs specified by the WQT program. Five BMPs 
are featured: riparian buffers, animal fences, no till, waste storage facilities, and nutrient 
management. The analysis in this section includes two parts: the first part is to investigate 
the factors influencing farmers’ current usage of BMPs; the second part is to estimate 
farmers’ willingness to implement BMPs given different levels of compensation given in 
a survey. The results show that farmers who participate in the conservation programs are 
more likely to use BMPs at present, but these farmers may not accept the offer to 
implement additional BMPs. Farmers’ experiences about BMPs are more likely to 
persuade them to adopt additional BMPs than the level of compensation. The results also 
find that the practices of animal fences and waste storage facility are responsive to the 
levels of compensation offered. 
Given the result of farmers’ willingness to participate in BMPs through our proposed 
WQT program, my dissertation proposes a second objective: examine how much farmers 
may engage their lands in BMPs if they decide to implement BMPs, thus to discuss 
farmers’ limited ability to produce trading credits. Chapter three pursues this objective by 
exploring farmers’ potential adoption rates if they decide to participate in WQT programs. 
This section is conducted using a survey of farmers in the Kentucky River watershed 
introduced in Chapter two. In addition to asking the question of farmers’ willingness to 
implement BMPs, our survey also asked a follow-up question that how much farmers 
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may adopt the BMPs (in addition to what they have already used) if they are offered 
compensation through WQT. With respect to five different types of BMPs, about 21.5%, 
26.9%, 24.2%, 23.2%, and 18.2% of respondents did not indicate how much they would 
adopt BMPs. We compare three methods to handle the issue of missing data: deleting the 
observations with missing values, mean imputation, and the MICE. Following these 
missing data treatments, we estimate factors affecting how much farmers may engage in 
BMPs using a Tobit or Poisson model. The results show that increasing the compensation 
for using BMPs is more likely to encourage farmers to adopt more riparian buffers. In 
addition, land area, percentage of household income from farming, percentage of total 
household income reinvested back to farm, and current experience of BMPs are found to 
affect BMP adoption. Results obtained using MICE are more promising than using the 
deletion or the mean imputation method.  
In addition to economic and demographic characteristics, the third objective is to 
explore how wealth changes and local community interactions influence farmers’ BMP 
adoption. Understand how social factors and farms’ financial well-being affect BMP 
adoption can improve effectiveness and efficiency of WQT programs substantially, and 
reduce costs of searching for potential participants. Chapter four aims to address this 
objective. Chapter four is to investigate the effects of wealth changes and interactions 
with local communities on BMP adoption in addition to farmers’ demographic and 
socioeconomic variables. BMP adoption as part of farm investment is subject to farm 
financial condition. The urban housing market bust during 2007-2008 significantly 
decreases farmland values. The decrease of farm wealth therefore discourages 
environmental investments such as BMP adoption on farmlands in the future. In addition 
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to economic factors, previous studies also show that social interactions could motivate 
farmers to commit to environmental services. We develop a conceptual framework to 
model decisions of BMP adoption, and the decisions are subject to farm’s wealth 
condition. Then, we specify the linkage between BMP decisions and social interactions 
with local communities. In the empirical analysis, we combine survey data on BMP 
adoption conducted between 2011 and 2012 in Kentucky with the public data. Wealth 
changes are approximated by percentage differences of land values between 2007 and 
2012; social interaction effects of local community include urban and rural effect, 
residential effect, and local agricultural recreation business effect. Our results show that 
decreasing farmland values discourage the adoption of riparian buffers. If farms are 
located at metro counties, farm owners are less likely to adopt riparian buffers; when 
farms are located at rural counties, they are less likely to fence off animal from water 
resources. If farms are located at counties with large amount of equine inventory, they are 
more likely to build up animal fences and use nutrient management. Residential housing 




This dissertation provides four important implications. First, farmers in Kentucky are 
likely to be encouraged to build up riparian buffers, animal fences and waste storage 
facilities through the compensation potentially provided by buyers in the WQT market. It 
implies that the water quality trades that are related to, or targeted at, the three types of 
BMPs are more likely to succeed through a proposed WQT program in Kentucky. In 
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contrast, there is no statistical evidence supporting that farmers could be encouraged to 
implement no till or nutrient management through the compensation from these programs. 
It indicates that tradable permits related to these two practices may not be available in the 
WQT market. This implication will provide the buyers with information about potential 
permits in the market, and assist policy makers to design trading ratios and allocate 
budgets with respect to specific practices. 
    The second implication from the results is that farmers who are currently using riparian 
buffers, animal fences, no till, and nutrient management are more likely to expand the 
scope of these practices to generate additional credits for WQT. It implies that when 
buyers in the WQT market intend to purchase the emission permits generated from the 
above four practices, it is efficient for buyers to trade with farmers who are currently 
using these practices. This implication could also help policy makers target who may 
participate in WQT programs to supply trading permits. 
Third, we show that replacing the missing data with MI-generated values enhances the 
economic analysis and implications. While our research does not intend to offer a 
normative strategy, the MI method shows promise to specifically handle missing data for 
surveys involving farming decisions. The comparison between several popular schemes 
offers insights on their relative efficacy to address missing data. As a conservative 
strategy, we recommend dealing with missing data by providing results from both the 
deletion method and the MI method. The mean imputation method is not advisable as it 
may not generate results as reliable as the other methods especially when the researcher is 
uncertain about the underlying reasons for missing data.    
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The fourth implication is that if interactions with local communities motivate farmers’ 
commitment to BMP adoption, policy makers could identify potential BMP adopters and 
promote adoption in certain communities effectively; if the decline of land wealth 
discourages farmers to invest on BMP in the future, the traditional cost-sharing payment 






A. Appendices   
A 2.1 Four Types of Information Given to Farmers in the Survey 
Types of the 
information 
The text provide in the survey  
Level 1 No additional information provided 
Level 2 Information focuses on the cost aspect: 
    The U.S. EPA estimates that annual private point source (e.g., a 
manufacture factory) control costs were about $14 billion and 
public point source (e.g., a municipal sewage water treatment plant) 
costs were about $34 billion.  The National Cost to Implement 
Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) Draft Report estimates that 
flexible approaches, such as the water quality trading program, 
could save $900 million dollars annually compared to the least 
flexible approach.  For example, nitrogen trading among publicly 
owned treatment works in Connecticut that discharge into Long 
Island Sound is expected to achieve the required reductions under a 
TMDL while saving over $200 million dollars in control costs.  On 
the other hand, private non-point sources (e.g., farms) will obtain 
equal or better economic incentives than what they are currently 
receiving from government sources. 
Level 3 Information focuses on the environment aspect: 
    Market-based approaches can also create economic incentives for 
innovation, emerging technology, voluntary pollution reductions 
and greater efficiency in improving the quality of the nation's 
waters.  The market-based approaches such as water quality trading 
provide greater flexibility and have potential to achieve water 
quality and environmental benefits greater than would otherwise be 
achieved under more traditional regulatory approaches.  The U.S. 
government supports the creation of water quality trading 
shares/credits in ways that achieve ancillary environmental benefits 
and ecological services beyond the required reductions in specific 
pollutant loads, such as the creation and restoration of wetlands, 
floodplains and wildlife and/or waterfowl habitat.  The government 
also encourages securing long-term improvements in water quality 
through the purchase and retirement of shares/credits by any entity. 
Level 4 Information focus on both the environment and the cost: 






A 3.1 Imputation Models (Raghunathan et al. 2001)  
 
 
1 Linear Regression Model:  
 
 
Define 𝑦 as a variable that follows a normal linear regression model  
𝑦|𝑥~𝑁(𝑥′𝛽, 𝜎2) 
Where 𝑥 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, … … , 𝑥𝑘)′  is vector of k predictors of 𝑦, and is fully observed, 𝛽 is 
the 𝑘 × 1 vector of regression coefficients explaining the correlation between y and 
predictors 𝑥. 𝜎2 is the scalar variance.   
Assume that 𝑦 contains missing data that need to be imputed. Define 𝑦 = (𝑦𝑜, 𝑦𝑚) and 





𝑛 = 𝑛𝑜 + 𝑛𝑚 
𝑦 with missing data 
𝑥 predictors fully 
observed 
𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑛𝑜 𝑦𝑜 𝑥𝑜 
𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑛𝑚 𝑦𝑚 𝑥𝑚 
 
The imputation model is specified as follows:  
1. Using observed 𝑦𝑜and 𝑥𝑜, calculate ?̂? = [𝑥𝑜′𝑥𝑜]
−1𝑥𝑜′𝑦𝑜 and ?̂? = (𝑦𝑜 − 𝑥𝑜?̂?) 
2. Generate 𝜎2̂ = ?̂?′?̂?/g where g is a draw from 𝜒𝑛𝑜−𝑘
2  distribution.  
3. Draw 𝛽|𝜎2~𝑁[?̂?,  𝜎2̂[𝑥𝑜′𝑥𝑜]
−1] 
4. Draw  𝑦𝑚 ~ 𝑁[𝑥𝑚?̂̂?,  𝜎
2̂] , ?̂̂? is the most recent draw of 𝛽 in step 3.  
5. Using y [𝑦𝑜 , 𝑦𝑚] and [𝑥𝑜, 𝑥𝑚] , repeat steps 1 – 4 after appropriate adjustments.  
 After the first round, β̂ is obtained using y [𝑦𝑜, 𝑦𝑚] and x[𝑥𝑜, 𝑥𝑚] where 𝑦𝑚 is the 
imputed value from the most recent round, the degree of freedom of χ2 distribution in 





















2 Logit Model: 
 
Define 𝑦 is a variable that follows a logistic model: 





Where 𝑥 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, … … , 𝑥𝑘)′  is vector of k predictors of 𝑦, and is fully observed, 𝛽 is 
the 𝑘 × 1 vector of regression coefficients explaining the correlation between y and 
predictors 𝑥.    
Assume that 𝑦 contains missing data that need to be imputed. Define 𝑦 = (𝑦𝑜, 𝑦𝑚) and 





𝑛 = 𝑛𝑜 + 𝑛𝑚 
𝑦 with missing data 
𝑥 predictors fully 
observed 
𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑛𝑜 𝑦𝑜 𝑥𝑜 
𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑛𝑚 𝑦𝑚 𝑥𝑚 
 
The imputation model is specified as follows:  
1. Using observed 𝑦𝑜and 𝑥𝑜 to fit a logistic model to obtain the maximum likelihood 
estimates  ?̂? and its asymptotic covariance matrix 𝑉.  
2. Let 𝑇 be the Cholesky decomposition of 𝑉 where 𝑉 = 𝑇𝑇𝑡  
3. Draw 𝛽 : ?̂̂? = ?̂? + 𝑇𝑧  where vector  𝑧 is a random normal deviates with dimension 
rows ?̂? 
4. Using ?̂̂?, the most recent draw of 𝛽 in step 3, to fit  
 




′ ?̂̂?) + 1
 
 
5. Generate a vector 𝑢 of uniform random numbers between 0 and 1 with dimension rows 
𝑦𝑚. 
6. With respect to each individual, impute one if  𝑢 ≤ 𝑃∗, and zero otherwise. 





3 Multinomial Logit Model:  
 
Define 𝑦 is a variable that contains 𝑙 categories (𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑞 = 𝑙 is the base outcome) 
follows a multinomial logistic model: 
Pr(𝑦 = 𝑞|𝑥) =
exp (𝑥′𝛽𝑞)
1 + ∑ exp(𝑥′𝛽𝑞)
𝑙−1
1





Where 𝑥 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, … … , 𝑥𝑘)′  is vector of k predictors of 𝑦, and is fully observed, 𝛽𝑞 
is the 𝑘 × 1 vector of regression coefficients explaining the correlation between outcome 
𝑞  and predictors 𝑥.    
Assume that 𝑦 contains missing data that need to be imputed. Define 𝑦 = (𝑦𝑜, 𝑦𝑚) and 




𝑛 = 𝑛𝑜 + 𝑛𝑚 
𝑦 with missing data 
𝑥 predictors fully 
observed 
𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑛𝑜 𝑦𝑜 𝑥𝑜 
𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑛𝑚 𝑦𝑚 𝑥𝑚 
 
The imputation model is specified as follows:  
 
1. Using observed 𝑦𝑜and 𝑥𝑜 to fit a multinomial logistic model to obtain the maximum 
likelihood estimates  (?̂?1, ?̂?2, ?̂?3 , … ?̂?𝑞 … , ?̂?𝑙−1) and its asymptotic covariance matrix 
𝑉 = 𝑇𝑇𝑡where 𝑇 is the Cholesky decomposition  
2. Draw 𝛽 : 𝛽?̂? = ?̂?𝑞 + 𝑇𝑧  where vector  𝑧 is a random normal deviates with dimension 
rows ?̂?𝑞 
4. Using ?̂̂?, the most recent draw of 𝛽𝑞 in step 3, to fit  
𝑃∗𝑞 = Pr(𝑦𝑚 = 𝑞|𝑥) =
exp (𝑥𝑚
′?̂̂?𝑞)










5. Generate a vector 𝑢 of uniform random numbers with dimension rows 𝑦𝑚. 




1  and 𝑅𝑙 = 1 be the cumulative sums of the probabilities. 
Impute outcome  𝑞 if 𝑅𝑞−1 < 𝑢 < 𝑅𝑞 





4 Predictive Mean Matching (PMM) Model:  
 




Where 𝑥 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, … … , 𝑥𝑘)′  is vector of k predictors of 𝑦, and is fully observed, 𝛽 is 
the 𝑘 × 1 vector of regression coefficients explaining the correlation between y and 
predictors 𝑥. 𝜎2 is the scalar variance.   
 
Assume that 𝑦 contains missing data that need to be imputed. Define 𝑦 = (𝑦𝑜, 𝑦𝑚) and 






𝑛 = 𝑛𝑜 + 𝑛𝑚 
𝑦 with missing data 
𝑥 predictors fully 
observed 
𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑛𝑜 𝑦𝑜 𝑥𝑜 
𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑛𝑚 𝑦𝑚 𝑥𝑚 
 
 
PMM method follows steps of the linear regression model except last two steps:  
4. Draw  𝑦𝑚 ~ 𝑁[𝑥𝑚?̂̂?,  𝜎
2̂] to obtain 𝑦?̂? the prediction of 𝑦𝑚.  
5. Generate first 𝑠 minimums determined based on the absolute differences between the 
linear prediction for incomplete observation 𝑖 and linear predictions for complete 
observations, such as  
 
|𝑦?̂? − 𝑦?̂?|, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑜𝑏𝑠 
𝑗𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑛  
|𝑦?̂? −  𝑦?̂?| = 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑗∈𝑜𝑏𝑠 |𝑦?̂? −  𝑦?̂?| 
 
6. For the missing observation 𝑖 of 𝑦𝑚 , 𝑦𝑚 = 𝑦𝑗𝑚𝑖𝑛   , where 𝑗𝑚𝑖𝑛 is randomly drawn from 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































back to farm 
Income (1000 dollars) 
1 8% 8% 0.5 
2 23% 23% 20 
3 38% 38% 37.5 
4 53% 53% 62.5 
5 68% 68% 87.5 
6 82% 82% 125 









A 3.4 Imputation Assessment 
 
    Following van Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn (2011) and Azur, Stuart, Frangakis 
and Leaf (2011), we examine the distribution of the observed and imputed data visually. 
For each scenario, I conduct 1000 times of iteration and generate 1000 datasets for 
assessment. Figures from A1 to A10 display means and standard deviation of 1000 
datasets for readers’ references. Since the imputation is conducted using the log 
transformation, the means and standard deviations are also the log transformation term.  
    Then I conduct imputation assessment from three aspects. First, I compare the means 
between observed data and imputed data, in order to observe whether there are drastic 
changes after imputation. Abayomi, Gelman and Levy (2008) conclude that the 
deviations between the imputed and observed data can be expected under MAR 
assumption, but researchers should be especially careful of extreme departures. However, 
it does not imply that the observed mean is the benchmark of the imputation. This 
comparison is to diagnose the extreme departure.  




 percentile of mean as 
the bottom and top boundaries of convergence range. Then, I examine whether the means 
of observed and imputed data across 100 imputation results (the actual imputation for 
final results) fall into the confidence interval defined in our research.  Following existing 
literature, the 1000 iterations are long enough to justify whether our chained equations 
are stable and convergence. The underlying idea is that the more numbers of mean of 
imputation are out of convergence range, the less stable the imputation is.  
    Third, we investigate whether the mean of observed and imputed data of 100 
imputation iterations observed mean falls into the convergence assessment with 1000 
iterations. 
    All in all, the above assessment is to evaluate whether our imputation process is stable 





























































Table A.6 Assessment of the Multiple Imputation for the Missing Data in Using Riparian 
Buffers 





Distance between observed 
mean and mean of 100 
imputations 
(The larger the worse) 
0.441 0.3493 0.5738 0.5619 
Numbers of mean of 
imputation out of 
convergence range of 10-
90% percentile 
(The larger the worse) 
13 10 21 9 
Whether observed mean 




percentile of mean of the 
convergence assessment 
with 1000 iterations 
Yes  Yes  No Yes  





Table A.7  Assessment of the Multiple Imputation for the Missing Data in Using Animal 
Fences 





Distance between observed 
mean and mean of 100 
times of imputation 
(The larger the worse) 
0.1677 0.1881 0.1089 0.153 
Numbers of mean of 
imputation out of 
convergence range of 10-
90% percentile 
(The larger the worse) 
6 12 2 14 
Whether observed mean 




percentile of mean of the 
convergence assessment 
with 1000 times of iteration 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table A.8  Assessment of the Multiple Imputation for the Missing Data of Using No Till 





Distance between observed 
mean and mean of 100 
times of imputation 
(The larger the worse) 
0.1322 0.0203 0.1442 0.0158 
Numbers of mean of 
imputation out of 
convergence range of 10-
90% percentile 
(The larger the worse) 
21 3 26 5 
Whether observed mean 




percentile of mean of the 
convergence assessment 
with 1000 times of iteration 
No  Yes No  Yes 




Table A.9 Assessment of the Multiple Imputation for the Missing Data of Using Waste 
Storage Facilities 





Distance between observed 
mean and mean of 100 
times of imputation 
(The larger the worse) 
0.0444 0.0619 0.0531 0.0362 
Numbers of mean of 
imputation out of 
convergence range of 10-
90% percentile 
(The larger the worse) 
1 6 0 4 
Whether observed mean 




percentile of mean of the 
convergence assessment 
with 1000 times of iteration 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 







Table A.10 Assessment of the Multiple Imputation for the Missing Data of Using 
Nutrient Management 





Distance between observed 
mean and mean of 100 
times of imputation 
(The larger the worse) 
0.0057 0.0798 0.0095 0.0681 
Numbers of mean of 
imputation out of 
convergence range of 10-
90% percentile 
(The larger the worse) 
0 4 0 2 
Whether observed mean 




percentile of mean of the 
convergence assessment 
with 1000 times of iteration 
1 1 1 1 





Table A.11 Summary of the Imputation Assessment  





Riparian buffers 2 1 4 3 
Animal fences 2 3 1 4 
No till 3 1 4 2 
Waste storage 
facilities 
1 4 2 3 
Nutrient 
management 
1 4 2 3 
Summary 
(the smaller, the 
better ) 
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